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TERMINATIONS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS*
Roy S.

MITCHELL**

JoHN H. TRAcy

**

For the uninitiated, a government contract can be a complex and
unfamiliar document. The novice practitioner may find it difficult to
define problems and determine rights and liabilities in an area of law
permeated by standard forms, general provisions, special conditions,
drawings, schedules, addenda, and amendments, and supplemented by
extensive and detailed procurement regulations, numerous circulars, and
an ever-increasing volume of case law. This Article will examine one
area of government contracting-terminations-in light of cases decided
during 1971 and 1972.
In the context of government contracts, "termination" is a word of
art. Its precise meaning is dependent upon the facts of the individual
case, as well as the type of termination clause relied upon by the government. Termination clauses provide for two distinct contingenciestermination for the default of the contractor and termination for the
convenience of the government. Recent cases have been helpful in
indicating problems which may arise from the use of these clauses, which
are entitled respectively, "Termination for Default-Damages for Delay
-Time Extensions" I and "Termination for Convenience of the Government." 2 Almost every government contract includes one of these
clauses or a variation thereoL 3
* This Article is adapted from lectures given by the authors at the 1972 and 1973
Government Contractor Conferences sponsored annually by Federal Publications, Inc,
in Washington, D.C.
• B.S., Cornell University; J.D., George Washington University. Partner, Lewis,
Mitchell & Moore, Washington, D.C. and Vienna, Va.; Council Member, Section of
Public Contract Law of the American Bar Association.
**B.A., Johns Hopkins University; J.D., American University. Associate, Lewis,
Mitchell & Moore, Washington, D.C. and Vienna, Va.
1. Armed Services Procurement Regulation (hereinafter ASPR) 7-602.5 (Fixed
Price Construction Contracts). See Appendix A for a discussion of this clause. The
clause is reproduced in its entirety.
2. ASPR 7-103.21(b), as amended by ASPR 7-602.29. This clause is reproduced in its
entirety in Appendix B.
3. As will be shown, there have been rare instances in which the government has
failed to include one of the standard form clauses. Such failure may change substan[ 817 1
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TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT

An examination of the cases decided during the past two years discloses that termination for default cases outnumbered termination for
convenience cases five to one;4 furthermore, of the approximately 360
default cases decided in 1971 and 1972, contractors prevailed in only

one out of four.5 An understanding of the rights and obligations of the
parties may be helpful in assessing the significance of these figures.
First, it is important to define the nature of a default action. As a
general rule, but with recognized exceptions, the contractor bears the
risk of his own failure. For example, if a contractor fails to meet a delivery or completion date," delivers nonconforming supplies," or fails
to comply with new" or established 9 social objectives, he may be placed
in default by the government. In fact, any failure on the contractor's
part to comply with any contractual requirement is a potential basis for
the government to declare the contractor in default. The default action,
if taken, terminates the contractor's right to proceed and subjects him to
potential liability to the government for excess costs incurred in reprocuring the contract items or services. In some cases, a contractor
also may be liable for common law or liquidated damages.
Default actions in supply and services contracts tend to outnumber
those in construction contracts,"0 most likely because far more supply
tially the rights and liabilities of the parties. See, e.g., North Star Aviation Corp. v.
United States, Ct. Cl. No. 264-69, 14 G.C. 172 (1972).

4. These figures are based on the research of the authors and include most, if not
all, termination cases decided during 1971 and 1972. The number of cases omitted, if

any, would not substantially change the ratio. In 1971, 158 cases concerned termination
for default and 31 cases involved terminations for convenience. In 1972 (through October 15, 1972), there were approximately 200 cases arising in a default context and
44 involving terminations for convenience. "Cases," as used herein, includes decisions
of the Comptroller General, the United States Court of Claims, the various Boards

of Contract Appeals, and, to a limited extent, decisions from federal district and
appellate courts.
5. The statistics are based on the authors' research and analyses of the cases.
6. See, e.g., Rio Hondo Containers, Inc., GSBCA No. 3494, 72-2 B.C.A. 9514; Cryer
& Parker Elec., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 15150 & 15417, 71-2 B.C.A. $ 8943.
9165.
7. See, e.g., Arjay Mach. Co., ASBCA No. 16072, 71-2 B.C.A.

8. ASPR 12-804; FPR 1-12.803.2. Two contractors reportedly have been precluded
from further government contracts until they comply with equal employment requirements. 14 G.C.

139.

9. ASPR 18-703 implements the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to a-7 (1970), and
the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-330 (1970).

10. This conclusion is based upon the authors' research and analyses of the cases.
See note 4 supra.
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contracts are awarded; in addition, the highly technical specifications
which manufacturers must meet in supply contracts often produce difficulties. Another factor is that services contracts, particularly those
for janitorial services, often are performed by individuals or small companies with little or no financial backing and no experience with government requirements. These factors often result in deficient performance
culminating in a termination for default.
The standard form contract invariably contains a default clause giving
the government the power to declare a contractor in default for his
failure to render contractually-required performance," failure to make
progress toward performance of the contract, 2 or failure to comply
with other contract requirements or clauses. 1 The first two situations
present the classic "performance failure" and "progress failure," respectively. 14
A progress failure has been described as the middle ground between
an actual performance failure and a renunciation by the contractor of
his contractual obligation.Y The government can terminate a contract
if the contractor has failed to make progress to such a degree that performance of the contract is in jeopardy, the government has given a
cure notice (if required), and the contractor has done nothing to remedy
the failure within the time allowed after receipt of the cure notice,""

which in most cases is 10 days. 7 However, a cure notice is not required
upon a failure of performance; 8 nor is such notice required if a contractor's actions amount to a repudiation of the contract.
Once a failure of some type has occurred, the burden is on the contractor to interpose a valid defense, such as excusable delay.' 9 It is at
11. See note 1 supra.
12. Id.
13. Many of the social-purpose clauses, such as those providing for equal employment or safety standards, declare that a failure to comply will be considered a default.
See notes 8 & 9 supra.
14. R. NAsH & J. CmmNc, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAw 664 (2d ed. 1968); R. Speidel,
Default for Failure to Make Progress,Briefing Papers # 64-5, 1 BPC 87.
15. See R. Speidel, supranote 14.
16. See note I supra.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. ASPR 7-602.5 (d) (1):
(d) The Contractor's right to proceed shall not be so terminated nor the
Contractor charged with resulting damage if:
(1) The delay in the completion of the work arises from unforeseeable
causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor, including but not restricted .to, acts of God, acts of the public
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this point that the familiar language "beyond the control and without
the fault or negligence" of the contractor and his subcontractors becomes
important ° Excusable delays must be proven by the contractor. 2' For
example, if a contractor could not perform because of a flood or fire
and he can demonstrate that he was not responsible, his default may be
excused. 2 Of course, flood and fire are just two of the many causes
listed in the termination clause;28 furthermore, many causes not specifically listed in the clause may be grounds for excuse.
A repudiation is an unequivocal statement or act of the contractor
indicating that performance will not be forthcoming. It need not be,
but often is, accompanied by an actual abandonment of the contract. 25
However, a repudiation also may be found in an admission of inability
to perform, when such admission is viewed in the context of actual
progress or lack thereof; 26 this may be the case even though the con-

tractor is making an effort to perform.27
It is important to note that there are differences between the default
clauses in fixed price construction contracts and those in fixed price
supply contracts, and that a cure notice is not specifically required in
the former.2 It also should be noted that the rights provided by default
and delay damages clauses are cumulative, supplementing other rights
and remedies of the government.2" The right to terminate for default,
enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the
Government, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight
embargoes, unusually severe weather, or delays of.subcontractors or suppliers
arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault
or negligence of both the Contractor and such subcontractors or suppliers ....
20. Id.
3501. See R. NASH & J.
21. Allied Contractors, Inc., IBCA No. 265, 1962 BCA
CiBmc, supra note 14, at 607.
22. See note 19 supra.
23. Id.
24. The authority supporting this proposition is voluminous and not peculiar to the
field of government contracts. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610; RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 310 (1932); S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CoTRAcrs § 1300 (3d ed.
1931). However, the doctrine will be discussed and cited only in the context of government contracts.
8739,
25. See, e.g., Hydro-Space Systems Corp., ASBCA No. 15275, 71-1 B.C.A.
13 G.C. 274.
26. See, e.g., Charles J. Slicklen Co., GSBCA No. 3566, 72-2 B.C.A. 9666.
27. Id.
28. See note 1 supra.
29. See R. NASH & J. Ciaimic, supra note 14.
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however, is limited greatly by the excusable delay provision, and the
clauses in both types of fixed price contracts contain provisions which
convert a default termination to a termination for the convenience of the
government if the delay by the contractor was excusable. 3 Thus, an
excusable delay precludes use of the government's right to terminate
for default on account of that delay.".
The use of the word "may" in the termination for default clause is
of the utmost significance.' As a result of that language, the decision to
declare a contractor in default is within the discretion of the contracting
officer. If a contractor is technically or 'even actually in default, it is
for the contracting officer, in theory, to determine whether default or
continued performance would best meet the government's needs.
Another significant factor in a default termination is waiver. There
have been recent decisions dealing with waivers, 3 as well as with the
vexatious question of preproduction article submittals and approvals.m
The waiver issue generally revolves around the question of when a
waiver occurs. A waiver results in the loss, at least temporarily, of the
government's right to terminate for default.35 The failure to terminate
immediately upon the occurrence of events giving rise to a right to
terminate, however, will not in itself constitute a waiver;80 nor will the
passage of a reasonable amount of time after the right accrues,37 since the
government is entitled to a reasonable time to decide upon a course of
action.-s What passage of time will suffice to constitute a waiver is dependent upon the facts of the individual case. Most cases in which a
waiver has been found were based on the government's actions in encouraging, or at least permitting, the contractor to continue performance; under such circumstances, the contractor will have incurred additional expenses.3 9 To permit termination after the contractor has relied
30. See note 1 supra.
31. See note 19 supra.
32. ASPR 7-602.5 (a): "(a) If the Contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the work
.. the Government may . .. terminate...." (emphasis supplied).
33. H.N. Bailey & Associates v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 156, 13 G.C. 439 (1971);
New Jersey Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 15216, 72-1 B.CA. 9420.
34. A.C. Ball Co., ASBCA No. 16108, 72-1 B.CA. 9347; Mindeco Corp, ASBCA
No. 15877, 71-2 B.C.A.

9083.

35. Boston Pneumatics, Inc., GSBCA No. 3198, 72-2 B.C.A.
9613.
36. Temco, Inc, ASBCA No. 13907, 71-1 B.CA. 8683.
37. Gardner Constr. Co, DOT CAB No. 71-13, 71-2 B.C.A.
9096.
38.. Clark Cable Corp., ASBCA. No. 17090, 72-1 B.C.A.
9463.
39. Al Greene, Inc, ASBCA No. 15225, 71-1 B.CA. 8789.
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to his detriment on government action or inaction would be inequitable
and could result in severe hardship.4 °
As broad and potentially damaging as the termination right may be,
it must be exercised or implemented in accordance with established procedures. 4 ' The problem encountered most often in this area involves
the requirement of a written notice. If the contractor expressly repudiates the contract-for example, by a simple refusal to perform-the
government may consider such repudiation to be an anticipatory breach
and terminate immediately without regard to any requirement for a
10-day notice. 43 Moreover, even if the contractor is willing to perform
or to attempt performance while conceding his inability to do so, termination without notice is permissible. 4
: The fact that a contractor has been declared in default, however, does
not necessarily mean that the government no longer requires the supplies,
ervices, or. construction which he was to provide. As a general rule,
with certain prescribed exceptions, a contractor will be liable for the
assessment of excess costs of reprocurement.45 In order to impose liability, however, the government must comply with certaini requirements;
for example, the repurchase must be made within a reasonable time after
default, at a reasonable repurchase price, and with an attempt to mitigate
the contractor's damages.40 In addition, the government is required47
to reprocure items, services, or supplies which are similar to those which
the defaulted contractor was to have provided.4 Upon failure to comply with these requirements, the government loses the ' right to assess
excess Costs.4 9

If the contracting officer meets these specific requirements, however, he has vast discretion in reprocurement. For example, even though
the original contract was procured on an advertised basis, it may be reprocured on a negotiated basis. 50 Moreover, although there may haVe
40. Baifield Indus., Division of A-T-O, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 14582 & 14583, 72-2 B.C.A.
9676

41. See note 1 supra.
42. Id.
43. See note 175 infra.
44. Id.
45. See note 1 supra.
46. Beach Architectural Prod., ASBCA No. 16179, 72-1 B.C.A. .9374.
47. See note 1 supra.
9086, 14 G.C. 35.
48. Land-Air, Inc., ASBCA No. 15091, 71-2 B.C.A.
9544.
49. American Trans-Coil Corp., ASBCA No. 16651,. 72-2 B.C.A.
50. Space Avionics, Inc., ASBCA No. 13410, 71-1 B.C.A. 8784; Comp. GEN. B-171636
(January 17, 1972).
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been multiple bidders on the original procurement, the contracting officer may use a sole source basis in reprocurement if he thinks it necessary and can demonstrate that need. ' If the items were on an extended
delivery schedule under the original contract but have since become
urgently needed, they can be reprocured at a premium for accelerated
delivery.52 The underlying requirement for the contracting officer in
making decisions such as these is that the reprocurement costs meet a
standard of reasonableness.53 As in most areas, the question of what is
reasonable conduct in the awarding of a reprocurement contract depends
upon the circumstances.M The test usually imposed by the various
boards is whether the contractor has been prejudiced by the government's actions in reprocuring the item.5
A difficult area related to terminations for default is the question of
damages for breach of contract. Generally, in the absence of a liquidated
damages provision, the government must prove the extent of its damages
and that they were incurred as a result of the contractor's default. 6 For
purposes of examining the above principles in the light of recent cases,
it is possible to distinguish certain problem areas in which terminations
for default customarily occur. The subsections as divided below ad7
mittedly are somewhat arbitrary but do serve this purpose.5
A. Inspection and Testing
In order to assure itself that it is obtaining the performance for which
it bargained, the government usually includes clauses in its contracts
which permit it to test and inspect the contractor's performance. 8
These clauses may specify the time, frequency, location, and method of
testing. If the contractor's performance fails to pass these tests and in-'
spections, he has not complied with the contract and may be declared
51. CoMp. GEN. B-175482 (May 10, 1972).
52. Hydro Fitting Mfg. Corp., NASA BCA Nos. 1169-20 & 370-4, 71-2 B.C.A. 9042;
Gunhill Indus., Inc., ASBCA No. 14662, 71-2 B.C.A. 9174; Breed Corp, ASBCA Nos.
15040 & 15130, 72-2 B.C.A.
9488.
53. American Metal Fabricators Co., ASBCA No. 12986, 71-1 B.C.A.

8772, 13 G.C.

324.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., National Elec. Metal Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 14806, 71-1 B.C A. 8839.
56. Atlantic Terminal Co., ASBCA No. 13699, 71-1 B.C.A. 1 8866, 13 G.C. 384. "
57. The basic framework adopted here was used originally by the late Mr, E.K.
Gubin, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., who practiced widely in the'area of government
contracts for many years.
58. ASPR 7-103.5 & 7-602 11; FPR 1-7.101.5.
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in default. Conversely, if the government exceeds or otherwise exercises improperly its inspection or testing rights, the default action may
be overturned.
One of the obvious ways by which a contractor can challenge the
validity of the government's test findings is to attack the procedure
itself. If the government specifies in its contract the manner in which
it intends to test the contractor's performance, it cannot later declare
the contractor in default on the basis of tests different from those prescribed. 9 Similarly, if the government uses equipment that malfunctions60 or uses the equipment improperly,"' the results are untrustworthy
and may not be relied upon to justify a default termination.6 In terms
of time and location, the government also must comply with the provisions of the contract. If the contract specifies a one-time test at a manufacturer's plant just prior to packaging and shipment, the government
does not have the right to declare a default on the basis of subsequent
tests at a different location 3 unless there is a latent defect, fraud, or
gross mistake. 4
Moreover, the government may not dispense with testing merely
because it feels that other factors tend to prove non-conformance. In
Oyai Kogyo Co., 5 the government relied on the expiration of the manufacturer's recommended shelf life of the material the contractor had
proposed to use. However, the board decided that this factor alone was
not enough to justify the default action.' The rationale appeared to be
that expiration of the shelf life, in the absence of reliable test data, was
not equivalent to a finding that the material was defective. This result
may be questioned, however, since most government contracts contain
boilerplate provisions which require the contractor to supply "new"
material or material of the "most suitable grade for the purpose intended." 7 Absent other pertinent contract language, a cogent argument could be made that the material supplied by the contractor did
not meet this requirement and, consequently, that he was in default.
59. Video Research Corp., ASBCA No. 14684, 71-2 B.C.A.

9006.

60. Electro Plastic Fabrics, Inc., ASBCA No. 14761, 71-2 B.C.A. I 9118, on reconsideration, 72-2 B.C.A. 9519.
61. A. C. Ball Co., ASBCA No. 16108, 72-1 B.C.A. 9347.
62. Id.
63. Apco Mossberg Co., GSBCA Nos. 3440 & 3552, 72-1 B.C.A. 9403, 14 G.C. 335.
64. Cf. Universal Engineered Systems, Inc., IBCA No. 900-4-71, 72-1 B.C.A.
9355.
65. ASBCA No. 14853, 72-1 B.C.A. 9291.
66. Id.
67. ASPR 7-602.9.
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In those instances in which defaults for failures in the inspection and
testing stage have been upheld, recent cases have revealed two recurring problems: first, the contractor could not prove that the government improperly tested his product; 68 second, the contractor completely
misread his specifications and failed to understand what was required of
him." For example, in Griffoiyn Co.,70 the contractor failed to have
the contract items tested by an independent firm as required by contract. His tender without satisfying this requirement placed him in
default.
Testing specifications may leave the government some latitude in
applying the tests. Thus, for example, if the contract provides an allowable range within which the government may test, then a default may
be declared if the tests indicate a failure anywhere within that range.7 '
Moreover, a contractor's attempt to prove an improper test often fails
with the causation element. Thus, although the government may have
acted improperly in performing a test, the default will not be overturned
unless the contractor can show a causal relation between the impropriety and the reason for default. 72
Testing and inspection customarily are completed prior to final acceptance and completion of the contract. Testing is final and conclusive
upon the government unless the item inspected contains latent defects,
fraud has been committed, or the inspection is vitiated by a gross mistake. 73 The terms of the contract also may be important in determining
the effect of inspection or testing. For example, in Cross Alero Corp.,74
the contract called for products of named manufacturers. However,
used items were delivered and accepted. Upon discovery of this fact, the
government terminated for default, even though payment had been
made. The contractor was found to have breached the one-year warranty in the guarantee clause. The board rejected the contractor's con68. See, e.g., John G. Carlsen & Co., GSBCA No. 2913, 71-1 B.C.A. 8612; Building
Maintenance Specialists, Inc., DOT CAB No. 71-35, 72-2 B.CA. i 9553.
69. See, e.g., Atlantic Luggage Mfg. Co., GSBCA No. 3095, 71-1 B.C.A. 8719.
70. GSBCA No. 3359, 71-2 B CA. t 8975.
71. Torque Controls, Inc., GSBCA No. 3486, 72-1 B.C.A. 9273.
72. In American Trans-Coil Corp., ASBCA No. 16651, 72-2 B.C.A.
9544, the government's improper testing did not relate to numerous other product deficiencies which
were the bases for default. In Allied Paint Mfg. Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 210-70
(Commissioner's Report filed February 24, 1972), a change in the testing procedures
did not cause the default.
73. See note 64 supra.
74. ASBCA No. 14801, 71-2 B.C.A. 9075, 14 G.C. 74.
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tendon that the contract was complete with delivery, acceptance, and
payment and that, therefore, the right to terminate for default did not
exist. According to the terms of the guarantee clause, the contractor's
warranty obligation did not expire until one year after delivery of the
defective goods. Nothing in that clause provided that payment released
the contractor from its obligation or that the government had to defer
payment to the end of the guarantee period in order to preserve its
rights. Accordingly, final inspection and acceptance did not foreclose
the government's rights to terminate for default for latent defects or
mistakes.
B. Defective Specifications
Although the avenues of attack upon the government's inspection
and testing procedures are limited, the voluminous specifications in government contracts often provide grounds for overturning a termination
for default. For example, if a contractor is declared in default for a
failure to perform or a failure to make progress, and that failure has
been caused by defective or inadequate design specifications, the termination is improper.15 This rule was first articulated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Spearin,70 which held that the inclusion of
design specifications in a contract constituted an implied warranty that
compliance with such specifications would constitute satisfactory performance. 77 In Universal Engineered Systems, Inc.,7 8 for example, a
termination was caused by the failure of the government to coordinate
different activities in the procurement program. The government declared the contractor in default, even though his equipment met the
,specifications supplied by the government. Upon a finding that the
source of the government's dissatisfaction was equipment other than
that supplied by the contractor, the default was overturned.
Default cases involving defective specifications are not as common as
might be expected; 79 however, an examination of the cases indicates
that an allegation of such a defect often proves successful for the con75. Cf. Cayuga Mach. & Fabricating Co., AEC BCA No. 69-4-70, 71-1 B.C.A.
8633,
reconsiderationdenied, 71-1 B.C.A_. V 8673, 13 G.C. 267 (prime contractor improperly
terminated contract with his subcontractor).
76. 248 U.S. 132 (1918).

77. Id.
78. IBCA No. 900-4-71, 72-1 B.C.A. 9355.
79. Such cases generally arise as constructive change claims for additional money
the contractor expended in attempting to comply with the specifications.
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tractor.8 0 In Cayuga Machine & FabricatingCo.,'1 for example, a prime
contractor supplied the subcontractor with mixed design-performance
specifications which required that certain motors be used in the work."2
When used, they did not meet the contract requirements. In deciding
the dispute, the board held that to require the subcontractor to tailor the
brand name motors to achieve the necessary standards would entail research and development efforts beyond his capabilities. Since the specification was defective, the default was held improper.s
If specifications are misleading or ambiguous, a default will not be
upheld. 4 Moreover, an assessment of excess costs cannot be based on
ambiguous specifications if the contractor's reasonable interpretation
differed from that of the government.8 5 However, if the contractor
participated in the preparation and drafting of the specifications, subsequent performance problems arising from ambiguities and uncertainties are not sufficient to vitiate the default.8 6
The government has the right to demand strict compliance with its
specifications and to obtain the product for which it contracted. A
contractor cannot unilaterally determine what will or will not serve the
government's interest.87 If performance is possible, the contractor must
perform in accordance with the specifications,88 unless there has been
a waiver or the parties have agreed to modify the contract. In Valk
ManufacturingCo., 89 the contractor failed to take notice of a change in
specifications. The contractor had numerous previous contracts under
80. Of the 12 cases the authors classified as being in the defective specifications
category, the contractor was successful in six.
8633, reconsiderationdenied, 71-1 B.C.A.
81. AEC BCA No. 69-4-70, 71-1 B.C.A.
8673, 13 G.C. 1 267.

82. For those unfamiliar with the unusual procedures which can be employed by the
ARC in its contracts, the prime contractor may be an agent of the government under
a contract management program and subcontractors may have the right of direct appeal

to the AEC BCA.
83. AEC BCA No. 69-4-70, 71-1 B.C.A. 1 8633. See Inflated Prod. Co., ASBCA No.
15083, 71-1 B.C.A.

8861, in which a contractor relied on a defective government-

furnished drawing.
84. ComP. GEN. B-170806 (November 10, 1970).

85. Sports Liner, Inc., AGBCA No. 293, 72-1 B.C.A. 9474.
86. A.C. Hoyle Co., ASBCA No. 15363, 71-2 B.C.A.
9137.
87. Martin & Turner Supply Co., ASBCA No. 16809, 72-2 B.C.A.

9610.

9002, the contractor
88. In Philip Bradley & Sons, AGBCA No. 314, 71-2 B.CA.
contended that the machinery specified by the government was unsatisfactory. After
default, the contractor was liable for the excess reprocurement costs of obtaining a
machine larger than the one he was to supply, since the contract provided that the
government could obtain either.
9465.
89. ASBCA No. 16547, 72-1 B.C.A.
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which he could supply the basic item using one of two methods. In the
instant contract, however, one of the alternative methods of performance had been deleted; unfortunately, the deleted method was the one
with which the contractor had produced the tendered goods. The case
is significant in illustrating the danger of a contractor's reliance on
extra-contractual matters. Except in very limited circumstances, a
contractor must look to the contract to determine his obligation. 90 To
rely on previous conduct when government needs and standards are
constantly changing is an extremely dangerous course of action.
Evidence of the success or failure of other contractors using the same
or similar specifications often is introduced by both the government and
contractors to prove the workability of specifications. The contractor,
of course, will attempt to utilize the difficulties encountered by other
contractors to show impossibility of performance or that the specifications are defective or ambiguous; the government, on the other hand,
will point to the performance of other contractors under similar circumstances to justify its default actions.9' The most effective means of
attacking such evidence is to prove that there is some substantial difference b'etween the two sets of specifications. For example, the contractor may be able to show that the government granted waivers to
other contractors whose specifications the government is holding out as
similar. However, this type of proof is not as accessible to the contractor as it is to the government unless information filters throughout
the industry, the problem becomes public knowledge, or the contractor's
attorney pursues discovery vigorously.

C. Impossibility of Performance
Cases involving impossibility of performance often relate to problems of defective specifications. However, in the impossibility cases,
performance of the work either is actually impossible or would result in
the economic demise of the contractor. Thus, there may be either
practical or commercial impossibility. Both situations were confronted
in the five cases dealing with impossibility that were decided during
1971 and 1972.
In Crescent Precision Products,9 2 the government imposed an additional performance requirement after the award of the contract. The
90. Cf. Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 35-67, 14 G.C. t 208

(1972).
91. See, e.g., Environmental Enterprises Inc., GSBCA No. 3086, 71-1 B.C.A.
9160.
92. ASBCA No. 14770, 71-2 B.CA.

8720.
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effect of the added requirement was to render impossible the contractor's compliance with an existing and unchanged specification. It was
held that the contractor's inability to perform was excusable.
Even if technical problems are not present, a default may be excused
if it is commercially impracticable for the contractor to perform, so
long as he has not assumed that risk. Three decisions during 1972 dealt
with this problem? 3 Each involved a finding that the costs of performance or the level of effort required by the contractor would be so great
that to require him to perform would result in his financial ruin. The
doctrine of commercial impracticability was explained in one of these
decisions as follows:
In addition, the unrebutted expert testimony which appears in the
record demands a finding that it was practically impossible to perform the specification imposed on the appellant because of the extreme and unreasonable difficulty and expense required to comply
therewith. This result is known by various doctrinal names, of
which legal impossibility and commercial impracticability are the
more common. The doctrine does not require literal impossibility
but rather is grounded upon the assumption that in legal contemplation something is impracticable when it can only be done at an
excessive and unreasonable cost. To sustain a claim of impossibility of performance it is incumbent to show that production in accordance with the specification is either beyond the state of the
existing art or else can only be achieved through expenditures so
unreasonable as to warrant a conclusion of commercial impractica4
bility
In a situation where unanticipated costs or effort result from the
actions of the government, 95 excuse from performance clearly is equitable. However, even if the element of affirmative fault or blame is lacking, performance may be excused. Thus, a finding that neither party
anticipated the degree of difficulty or risk inherent in the contract could
lead to the conclusion that the actual expenditures of time and money
required to perform would defeat the purpose of the contract or undermine the quid pro quo of the bargain between the parties, and that
93. J. A. Maurer, Inc. v. United States, Ct. C1. No. 34-71 (Commissioner's Report filed
October 5, 1972); Security Parachute Co, ASBCA No. 15535, 72-2 B.C.A.
9670;
Land-Air, Inc, ASBCA No. 15091, 71-2 B.C.A. 9086, 14 G.C. 35.
94. Land-Air, Inc, ASBCA No. 15091, 71-2 B.C.A.
9086, at 42,114.
95. See, e.g., Security Parachute Co., ASBCA No. 15535, 72-2 B.C.A. 9670.
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requiring the contractor to perform would severely damage or even
ruin his business. It follows that a default in such a case should be overturned. As with defective specifications, a failure to prove impossibility of performance often results from a paucity of evidence,9" or from
a showing by the government that another contractor has performed
under similar circumstances or with similar specifications. 7 Moreover,
an allegation of impossibility may fail if the contractor cannot show
that he has made a reasonable effort to comply with the specifications."
Another significant recent case on impossibility is Bethlehem Corporation v. United States,99 decided by the United States Court of Claims.
The case is noteworthy as a reaffirmation of the rule that a contractor
can assume the risk that performance of the work is impossible. 00 In
Bethlebem, the contractor played a significant role in the preparation of
the specifications. In fact, the actual contract contained temperature
requirements less stringent than the government originally contemplated, the contractor having indicated that performance to the more
stringent requirements likely would be impossible. The contract
therefore set forth the lesser performance criteria, and the contractor
was held to have assumed the risk of being unable to perform; accordingly, he could not interpose impossibility as a defense. The significance of the case is clear. A contractor should b-e fully knowledgeable
about the risks inherent in his contract, whether the specifications are
of the design or performance type. Furthermore, he should be aware
whether he has assumed. the risk of noncompliance with the specifications.
D. FinancialIncapacity
As a general rule, a contractor bears the burden of financing his
contract and maintaining the capital to perform.'0 ' The only exception
to this rule occurs when the government is responsible for the contractor's financial difficulties; in such case, a failure to perform is ex96. See, e.g., Video Research Corp., ASBCA No. 14412, 72-2 B.C.A. 9562; Electronic
Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 16808, 72-2 B.C.A. 9579.
97. See, e.g., Astronautics Corp. of America v. United States, 436 F.2d 430 (Ct. Cl.
1971); Southern Elec. Eng'r Co., ASBCA No. 15126, 72-1 B.C.A. 9426.
98. See, e.g., Industrial Elec. Hardware Corp. v. United States, Ct. C. No. 1-69
(Commissioner's Report filed January 10, 1972). The case was settled and dismissed
prior to the court's opinion, (Order of May 19, 1972).
99. 462 F.2d 1400 (Ct. CI. 1972).
100. Cf. Austin Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 76 (1963).
101. Davro Instrument Corp., ASBCA Nos. 16183, 16710, 72-1 B.C A. 9360.
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cusable. For example, in R-D Mounts, Inc., 10 2 the government's im-

proper termination of other unrelated contracts had a disastrous effect
on the contractor's performance. The appeal from a termination for
default was sustained because the contractor was able to prove not only
the impropriety of the government's actions but, more importantly, the
cause and effect relationship between the earlier terminations and the
contractor's subsequent inability to perform. However, the burden of
showing such a relationship rests with the contractor, and in similar
cases during the past year, contractors were unsuccessful in asserting
financial problems as an excusable cause of delay 103
Amexicana Corp.104 presented the related and provocative issue of
progress payments. Most government contracts contain a progress payment clause through which percentage payments based on monthly
progress are made to the contractor. Most contractors rely on such
progress payments to finance the performance of contracts. However,
unless the clause specifically provides otherwise, it is within the discretion of the government to make such payments. A provision that
the government may make progress payments does not obligate it to
do so. This interpretation contributed to the failure of the contractor's
appeal in Amexicana, where it was held that the financial difficulties
encountered by the contractor did not excuse his default. The related
issue of the amount of progress payments was presented in Steenberg
"ContructionCo.' 5 There, the board held that the contractor's financial problems and subsequent abandonment of the contract were inexcusable. Although the progress payments were based on underestimates
of the work, the board reasoned that the payments were subject to later
adjustment to reflect the actual amount of work performed. These
102. ASBCA No. 15340, 71-1 B.C.A. 8623. See also R-D Mounts, Inc., ASBCA No.
14827, 71-1 B.C.A. 8643, on reconsideration, 71-1 B.CA. 8725, 13 G.C. 276.
103. H&S 'Oil Co., ASBCA No. 16321, 72-2 B.C.A.
9520 (prospective loss by
contractor); Davro Instrument Corp., ASBCA Nos. 16183 & 16710, 72-1 B.C.A.
9360
(economically unfeasible performance); Central Fire Truck Corp, ASBCA No. 12715,
71-2 B.C.A. 8946 (lack of knowledge by both contractor and government that contractor's line of credit would be impaired); Hydro-Space Systems Corp., ASBCA No.
15275, B.C.A. 1 8739, 13 G.C. 274 (financial difficulty caused by government's tight
money policy); Larry K. Holladay & Jack Drake, DOT CAB No. 70-29, 71-1 B.C.A.
t 8610, reconsideration denied, 71-1 B.CA.
8661 (inability of contractor to obtain
supplies on credit because of dissolution of partnership). See also Ram Mach. Co.,
ASBCA No. 16318, 72-1 B.C.A.
9439.
104. ASBCA No. 14417, 71-1 B.CA. 8886, reconsiderationdenied, 71-2 B.C.A. 8990,
12 G.C. 300.
105. IBCA No. 520-10-65, 72-1 B.CA.
9459, 14 G.C.
360.
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cases indicate the difficulties inherent in basing an appeal from a default
termination on financial incapacity.
E. Government Actions and Inactions
A distinction must be drawn between actions of the government
which are discretionary in nature and those which it must take. Still
other government actions need not be undertaken, but must be taken
properly if undertaken at all. As to discretionary actions, the government will be subject to a requirement of good faith. As will b-e demonstrated, the determination whether the government has acted properly
under the circumstances may be difficult.
Improper or unfair action by the government generally results in
the vitiation of a default; in such a case, either the termination for default
will be converted into one for the convenience of the government or
an assessment of -excess costs will be disallowed. Many cases involve
contracts which have been administered poorly by the government.
For example, where work was placed under a government hold order,
the government could not later claim that the contractor was in default
10 6
for delay.
Miller Lumber Co.1 7 and Dr. Theodore 1. Wang °8 involved notice
problems. In Miller Lumber, the government received the contractor's
shipment of supplies, but failed to keep it intact. It also failed to give the
contractor notice of alleged shortages. In this situation the contractor
not only was powerless to take corrective action, but also was unable
to verify the need for such action in the first instance. As a result of
these lapses of government administration, an allegation of the contractor's default was held improper. Similarly, in Wang, the termination
was deemed premature because the contractor neither was advised of
the defects claimed by the government nor afforded an opportunity
to correct them. 109
In Ted C. Frome,"0 the government desired to substitute a contractor who would guarantee that performance would be made either within
the original time for performance or within that time as extended because of excusable delays. The contract with From'e was terminated
for default before he officially received a time extension to which he
105.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Delta Eng'r & Sales, Inc., ASBCA No. 16326, 72-1 B.C.A. 9373.
ASBCA No. 15908, 72-1 B.C.A. 9208.
PSBCA No. 504, 72-1 B.C.A.
9473.
Cf. Affiliated Metal Prod. Co., ASBCA No. 15567, 71-2 B.C.A. 8947.
AGBCA No. 246, 71-1 B.C.A. 8611.
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was entitled. The default was overruled, and the contract was deemed
terminated for the convenience of the government. The government
originally might have terminated the contract with From'e for convenience, stating as a reason its desire to retain another contractor, since
a shorter performance time would be in the best interest of the government. However, under these circumstances, it was improper to invoke
the default termination clause.
Occasionally, a contractor cannot demonstrate that a particular act
of the government has been serious enough to invalidate a default termination. However, the boards generally have been willing to examine the
government's conduct throughout the performance of a contract in
order to ascertain whether the aggregate of its actions has affected the
contractor's ability to perform."' Several instances of such misconduct
or faulty administration recently have been found by the boards."'
However, contractors cannot always expect to escape default penalties
because of the government's actions or inactions. For example, in Aerospace Support Equipment, Inc.," 3 the board found that the government
was negligent for not maintaining adequate surveillance of the original
contractor's performance and in actually delaying nine months before
terminating the contract. However, these two facts were considered
insufficient to overturn the default, since the contractor's successor in
interest (a third party had acquired the original contractor) had disavowed the contract by admitting its inability to perform. The board,
applying the recognized test used in such situations, determined that
the contractor had not been prejudiced by the government's delay.
Waite Transport, Inc." 4 and Chester Morton Electronics, Inc.,"
although factually and legally distinct, contain a common element
relating to the exercise of discretion by a contracting officer with regard
111. See, e.g., John R. Chrisman & Associates, GSBCA Nos. 3248 & 3278, 71-2 B.C.A.
9167; 14 G.C. 25.
112. In Aircraft Eng'r Corp., ASBCA No. 14911, 71-2 B.C.A. 8955, the government
failed to respond to requests for design review and approval which had to be obtained
before the commencement of production; in Cryenco, ASBCA No. 15944, 72-2 B.C.A.
9718, the contracting officer required performance in accordance with his erroneous
interpretation of the specifications; and, in Hempstead Maintenance Service, Inc.,
GSBCA No. 3127, 71-1 B.C.A. 8809, 13 G.C. 325, the default was overturned because the government did not disclose certain information about non-apparent conditions, which non-disclosure substantially increased the contractor's difficulty of performance.
113. ASBCA No. 13579, 71-1 B.C.A. 8904.
9472.
114. PSBCA No. 17, 72-1 B.C.A.
115. ASBCA No. 14904, 72-1 B.C.A. 9185.
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to government actions. In Waite, the contracting officer's decision to
discontinue postal service was, by express contract provision, within
his sole discretion. Considering the difficulty of proving an abuse of
discretion, dismissal of Waite's appeal is understandable. Late delivery
of the contract items justified the default in Morton. It was immaterial
that the contractor apparently could have proved that the government's
need for the items no longer existed. Since the contractor was in default,
there was no necessity for the contracting officer to resort to a termination for the convenience of the government. 116
Other cases in which the propriety of the government's conduct was
in issue have been decided in favor of the government either on the basis
that, as a matter of fact, there had been no impropriety, or that, although
117
there had been impropriety, it did not relate causally to the default.
For example, in Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Co. v. United States,"8
the government had accepted deliveries of contract items which did
not meet all the specifications, but subsequently rejected shipments with
the same defect. The Court of Claims held that acceptance of the earlier
shipments neither estopped the government nor constituted a waiver
of its rights to insist on strict compliance with the specifications for later
deliveries. Thus, the contractor's reliance on the government's actions
was unjustified.
Another facet of government action involves sureties on government
contracts. There is an old epigram to the effect that sureties are favored
by the law. However, sureties on government contracts rarely are
116. See P. J. Hydraulics, Inc., ASBCA No. 16310, 72-2 B.C.A. $ 9524, 14 G.C. $ 398.
117. Those cases in which the boards found, either expressly or impliedly, that the
government acted properly are as follows: Allied Paint Mfg. Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl.
No. 210-70 (Commissioner's Report filed February 24, 1972) (government's demand for
125 percent of estimated quantities was not improper); Systems Design, Inc., ASBCA
9695 (government not required to accept less than entire
No. 16993, 72-2 B.C.A.
manuscript called for by contract); Guenther Systems, Inc, ASBCA No. 14187, 72-2
B.C.A. 9595 (default of entire contract for late delivery on two of five installments);
Airosol Co., GSBCA No. 3546, 72-2 B.C.A. 9534 (government not obligated to accept
contractor's conforming supplies after the contract had been terminated because of
the delivery of non-conforming supplies).
Two cases may be classified within the category of lack of causation. In Winchester
Screw Prods., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 15695 & 16011, 72-2 B.C.A. 9538, the government's
non-delivery of equipment was found not causally related to the contractor's own
performance failure. In Thomas E. Spicknall, Inc. v. United States, Ct. Cl. Nos. 275-67
& 207-70 (Commissioner's Report filed October 3, 1972), the government's change in the
payment medium was found not to have caused the default; however, it may have been
a breach of contract.
118. Ct. CL. No. 455-71, 14 G.C. 298 (1972).
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successful against the government because of a lack of privity. The
favoritism, if it does exist, generally is restricted to the surety-contractor
(principal) relationship. Thus, in United States 'v. ContinentalCasualty
Co.,' 9 it was held that the government did not act improperly in not
terminating a contract upon receipt of a notice that funds should be
preserved for the benefit of the surety because the contractor was in
danger of default. The court held that the government cannot be forced
into making a default decision by reason of a surety's notice." ° Also,
in Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States,121 the making of progress
payments to the contractor over the surety's objection was held insufficient action to make the government liable upon the contractor's default, since evidence was lacking that the funds were used for anything
other than the prosecution of the work.
F. SubstantialPerformance
It should be axiomatic that if the government terminates for default
after a contractor has completed or substantially completed its contract
work in proper fashion, the termination should be of no effect. In Fisherman's Boat Shop, Inc.,122 this principle was followed. Although the
contractor had not fully performed, the board held that the final design
report submitted to the government indicated a strong likelihood that
satisfactory performance of the contract would be forthcoming. The
same result was reached in Pacific Coast Refrigeration, Inc. 2 ' Since
only two minor items of work remained to be performed, the board did
not order the improper default termination converted to a termination
for convenience. Moreover, even though a default termination may be
proper, the contractor may be entitled to some consideration. In two
cases involving the same contractor, 124 the board ruled that default
terminations were justified, but that the contractor was entitled to compensation for the goods and services provided before termination.
119. 346 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. III. 1972).
120. Government agencies have deferred to external influence in other respects,
however, and terminated contracts for the convenience of the government. See John
Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 931
(1964) (to avoid a dispute with the Comptroller General); Schlesinger v. United
States, 390 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (as a result of Congressional hearings).
121. Ct. Cl. No. 161-67 (Commissioner's Report filed February 25, 1972).
122. ASBCA Nos. 15159, 15206, 72-1 B.CA. 1 9416.
123. ASBCA No. 14546, 71-2 B.C.A. 9146.
124. Ventilation Cleaning Eng'r, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 16678, 16774, 72-2 B.C.A.' 9537,
Ventilation Cleaning Eng'r, Inc., ASBCA No. 14747, 72-1 B.C.A. 1 9244.
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However, even though a contractor has substantially performed, the
government retains the right to demand strict compliance with specifications. Although defects in the work of the contractor in Levelator
Corp. of America125 were quite minor, he failed to take steps to correct
those defects within the reasonable, though short, time period which
was allotted to him for that purpose. In the absence of a waiver of
specifications or some benefit gained by the government, it has the right
to insist on the bargained-for performance. In Levelator, the contractor
simply did not supply the required items, although those which he did
supply admittedly were very close to what was required. In G.A.
Karnavas Painting Co.,126 the contractor did not make reasonable prog-

ress on a punch list. Although he had performed most of the work,
his failure to perform the corrective work was held to justify a default
termination.
G. ContractorFault or Default
The most commonly appealed question in cases involving terminations for default is whether the contractor's performance failures were
substantial enough to justify the government's action in invoking the
were successtermination clause.'7 During 1971 and 1972, contractors
128
ful in only three of the 78 cases involving this issue.
In 1967, the Court of Claims in Schweigert, Inc. v. United States,'
held that a delay by a second tier subcontractor which was not caused
by the fault or negligence of-and was beyond the control of-the prime
contractor and his immediate subcontractor, was an excusable cause of
delay. The boards generally follow this rule,180 although its application
125. VACAB Nos. 738 & 762, 71-1 B.C.A. 8721.
9369.
126. VACAB No. 922, 72-1 B.C.A.

127.
128.
129.
130.

During 1971 and 1972, approximately 78 cases involved this issue.
These figures are based upon the research of the authors. See note 4 supra.
388 F.2d 697 (Cr. Cl. 1967).
See, e.g., Rusty's Inc., ASBCA No. 13214, 69-2 B.C.A. 8065; Ransom Enter-

prises, Inc., VACAB No. 836, 69-2 B.C.A. t 7908; James Lundgren, ASBCA Nos. 11548
& 12400, 69-2 B.CA.. T 7904; Earl W. Wall' ASBCA No. 13273, 69-1 B.C.A. 1 7442;
Guin & Hunt, Inc., ASBCA No. 12015, 68-2 B.C.A. 7173; Galland-Henning Mfg. Co.,
IBCA No. 534-1265, 68-1 B.C.A. 6970; Reynolds Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 12015, 68-1

B.C.A. 6756.
The Schweigert doctrine was not followed in Glover & Miller, Inc., IBCA No. 75212-68, 69-2 B.C.A. 7988 (first tier subcontractor's employee negligently handled order
for materials to be placed with manufacturer); Robert D. Farquhar Constr. Corp,
GSBCA No. 2879, 69-2 B.C.A. 9 7905 (no proof that delay was caused by late delivery
from lower tier subcontractor); Circleville Metals Works, ASBCA No. 13177, 69-1 B.C.A.

19731

GOVERNMENT TERMINATIONS

is dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of the cases;
the only recent case decided on this issue adopted the rationale of
Schveigert.131 However, this defense apparently is no longer available
to contractors, since the government in 1968 rewrote the contract clauses
in an administrative effort to overrule Schweigert.132 The result is that
only those contractors operating under the old clause can avail themselves of the Schweigert defense. Apparently, the amended language
has accomplished its obj'ective.183
Levelator Corp. of America' fairly and logically applied a broad
concept of excusable delay. The contractor was a small manufacturer
whose plant facilities were adequate for normal operations only if
those operations were premised upon careful plant production management. The contract in issue was with the Veteran's Administration
and provided for the supply of certain surgical instruments. A fire
destroyed the packaging materials in which the supplies were to be
shipped, forcing the contractor to stop work and await the arrival of
replacement packaging materials. In the interim, plant operations were
rescheduled to utilize the same production area for the completion of
a government defense contract. However, because of changes in the
specifications of the defense contract, completion of that contract required more time than anticipated. When the replacement shipping
materials were received, the contractor was unable to resume and complete the V.A. contract immediately, and the V.A. terminated the
contract for default.
Since the destruction of the packaging materials had been an excusable cause of delay, the board held that the government must consider the individual contractor's capabilities under the actual conditions
encountered during performance. In this light, the contractor's decision
to utilize its facilities to work on the other government contract was
not unreasonable at the time it was made. The contractor had not
anticipated the changes in specifications and attendant delays in per7718; Jack Picoult, GSBCA No. 2351, 69-1 B.C.A. 7678, on reconsideration,69-2 B.C.A.
7604 (no proof that
7820; Thurmont Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 13473, 69-1 B.C.A.
the delays arose from unforeseeable causes beyond the contractor's control and without
his fault or negligence, or that of the first tier subcontractor).
131. Wiggins Elec. Co., ASBCA No. 14790, 72-1 B.CGA. 9190.
132. 10 G.C. t 505.
133. See, e.g., Margold Elec. Co, ASBCA Nos. 15984, 15985, 72-2 B.CA.. 1 9646.
8715, reconsideration denied, 71-2 B.C-A.
134. VACAB No. 820, 71-1 B.CGA.
9011, 13 G.C. 285.
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forming the defense contract or the direct impact those changes and
delays would have on his ability to make timely delivery on the V.A.
contract; more importantly, the rescheduling was a direct result of a
fire, one of the specified excusable delays under the V.A.'s default clause.
Thus, Levelator stands for the proposition that all events flowing reasonably and directly from an excusable delay fall under the umbrella
of the excusable delay. However, a caveat should be added in such a
case-the contractor should give the government reasonable notice of its
planned activities. A constant flow of information will place the government on notice of the actual status of performance, and it will be
more difficult for the government later to issue a default termination.
It would be even more difficult for the government to justify a subsequent default decision if it had raised no objection to a proposal for an
alternative course of action.
Many unsuccessful appeals stem from problems with subcontractors
and suppliers. As a general rule, a contractor bears the responsibility of
performing necessary work or supplying necessary items. If a subcontractor or supplier is to be retained to do part of the work, the contractor bears the risk of such party's failure to perform. Consequently,
the failure to enter into a binding agreement with the subcontractor
cannot be interpreted as an excusable cause of delay. 13 5 It follows that
the inability of a supplier to furnish materials does not excuse the prime
contractor's delay or default.'3 6 However, if the contractor can show
that at no time during the performance of the contract could the required materials or an acceptable substitute have been procured, it is
possible that the delay may be excused under the impossibility doctrine. 3 7 Similarly, if the government has directed the use of a sole
8667.
135. Edwin Kronfield, GSBCA No. 3241, 71-1 B.C.A.
136. See, e.g., Almac Scientific Co., ASBCA No. 16806, 72-2 B.C.A. 9678 (failure of
supplier to use specified material isnot excusable); Gard Indus. Inc., GSBCA Nos. 3614
& 3615, 72-2 B.C.A. T 9593 (delivery of non-conforming items not excused by supplier's
9488; Guenther
failure); Breed Corp., ASBCA Nos. 15040 & 15130, 72-2 B.C.A.
366 (subcontractor
9443, 14 G.C.
Systems, Inc, ASBCA No. 14032, 72-1 B.C.A.
9361
problems and late delivery); Monldey Corp., ASBCA No. 13071, 72-1 B.C.A.
(contractor obligated to find own source of supply); Franklin E. Penny Co., ASBCA
No. 15229, 71-2 B.C.A. $ 9159 (refusal of supplier to accept order, delay by second
supplier); Atlas Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 15177, 71-2 B.C.A. 1 9026 (unexplained late
delivery of supplies); Elber Tile & Binder Co., GSBCA No. 3188, 71-1 B.C.A. T 8759
(inability of contractor's supplier to furnish materials).
However, if the supplier is a second tier subcontractor, the Schweigert doctrine may
be applicable. See notes 129-33 supra & accompanying text.
137. See notes 92-100 supra & accompanying text.
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source, recent authority indicates that the latter's default may not be
imputed to the contractor."'
However, if the contractor or first tier subcontractor has the right
to avail himself of priority order ratings, the fact that suppliers or second
tier subcontractors have been subjected to strikes, for example, does not
excuse a failure to deliver if it can be shown that the contractor could
have eliminated the cause of delay.13 9 A contractor cannot simply "sit
out" a cause of delay without availing itself of contract rights, such as
a priority rating.
It is also necessary to examine the type of evidence which is required
-to overturn a default termination. The boards have long held, and
properly so, that an allegation of excusable delay is insufficient if merely
contained in a letter, pleading, or similar document, without more to
upport such an allegation. 140 Mere statements, accusations, and de.nnnciations are not substitutes for proof..4 Consequently, many terni-nations are upheld for lack of proof of the alleged excuse.'4
Pervading the entire area of government contracts is the problem of
determining rules of law or rules of conduct applicable to various parties. Video Engineering Co.143 illustrates the manner in which one
principle may apply to a contractor, while a different principle is applicable to the government under similar circumstances. On appeal, the
contractor maintained that his bid had been signed without authority.
9357, 14
138. American Elec. Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA No. 15109, 72-1 B.C.A.
G.C. T129. The result in such cases may be premised on several legal theories, for
example, misrepresentation or superior knowledge; see Latham, Kaplan Contractors,Inc.,
and the Superior Knowledge Doctrine: What Must The Government Disclose and
Why?, 4 Pun. CoNt. LJ. 191 (1971).
8751; Sherkade
139. Boston Pneumatics, Inc., ASBCA No. 14671, 71-1 B.C.A.
Constr. Corp., ASBCA No. 15098, 71-2 B.C.A. 9134.
8723
140. See, e.g., Federal Contractors, Inc, ASBCA No. 14336, 71-1 B.C.A.
(generalized testimony regarding excusable delay insufficient).
141. Empire State Tree Service, VACAB No. 949, 71-1 B.C.A. 8716 (allegation of
unusually severe weather without corroborative evidence). For the Mud of documentation necessary to prove an unusually severe weather claim see Mitchell, Excusable
Delays: Weather, Tim Smru CONsRucrioN Co mrArs CONFERENcE MANuAL (1971).
9366 (lack of proof that
142. K & M Constr., ENG BCA No. 2998, 72-1 B.C.A.
government animosities caused default); Ubique, Ltd., DOT CAB Nos. 71-28 & 71-28A,
313 (claim of unrealistic performance schedule un9340, 14 G.C.
72-1 B.C.A.
9179, reconsupported); Karlton Instruments, Inc., GSBCA No. 3293, 71-2 B.C.A.
sideration denied, 72-1 B.C.A. 9311 (failure to raise new matter on reconsideration);
8788, on reconsideration, 72-1
Dee-Lite Indus., Inc., GSBCA No. 3088, 71-1 B.C.A.
B.C.A. 9258; Essex Electro Eng'r., Inc., ASBCA No. 13566, 71-1 B.C.A. 1 8740 (no
proof that effort on defaulted contract was diverted to others).
143. DOT CAB No. 72-5, 72-1 B.C.A. 9432, 14 G.C. 362.
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The evidence indicated that the company executive who signed the bid
previously had signed other bids and was known by the government
personnel involved. In effect, his position, title, and activities all indicated that he had authority to submit a bid on behalf of the contractor.
Consequently, the board held that the executive had apparent authority
to act as he did; whether he had actual authority was immaterial. However, had the government been in the contractor's position, the result
would have been different. If a government representative or agent
purports to settle claims or order changes and it is later discovered that
the representative involved did not have actual authority, the government is not bound.4 Thus, actions taken by government representatives
who do not have actual authority are not binding on the government,
even though the representatives may have apparent authority. The application of different principles of law to different parties is an anomaly
peculiar to government contracting; accordingly, the burden is on the
contractor to investigate and determine the actual authority of those
with whom he deals on government work. 145 Disclaimers by government representatives such as "This action is subject to review 46and ap1
proval by higher authority" should put contractors on notice.
Another pitfall for contractors lies in the area of accord and satisfaction. In Allied Paint Manufacturing Co.,' 47 the contract had been
modified because of time extensions granted the contractor for certain
delaying events; however, the contractor had failed to assert an additional cause of delay. When he subsequently attempted to claim additional time, the government refused to grant a further extension. Tht
board upheld the government's action, holding that the contractor was
precluded from asserting his claim. Thus, if a contractor has a claim
and signs a release or modification without reserving further rights, he
may be said to have foreclosed the opportunity to submit a later claim.
If a contractor has multiple causes of delay, or even one cause of delay
the full impact of which he has not calculated, and the government has
recognized to some extent that he is entitled to additional time, the
contractor should not sign a modification or supplemental agreement
unless he has reserved his rights to claim additional time or is satisfied
that the time granted is sufficient.
144. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., & D.R. Kincaid, Ltd., ASBCA Nos. 9824 & 10199,
65-2 B.C.A. 4868.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. ENG BCA Nos. 2962 & 3043, 71-1 B.CA. 8765, 13 G.C. 183.
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Similarly, a lack of clearly-defined contractual standards was disastrous in Best Chemical Sales,148 where the contractor's appeal suffered
one crucial weakness. The failure to perform, the contractor alleged, resulted from actions of the Department of Agriculture, an agency not a
party to the contract. That department had objected to the manner
in which the contractor labeled his product and, upon the contractor's
refusal to revise the label, had refused to allow shipment. The contractor attempted to explain his failure to deliver on the ground that the
action of the Department of Agriculture prevented performance. However, it was found that the contractor had agreed to comply with whatever contract labeling requirements might be imposed on his product.
Whether the contractor anticipated such a requirement is not as significant as his refusal to perform in the face of contract requirements.
The result is analogous to the situation that arises when a contractor
agrees to comply with industry association codes or wages and safety
laws.
In Aireborne Security, Inc.,149 when the contractor determined that

he would be unable to provide the bond and insurance required before
performance could begin, he returned the contract documents to the
agency and insisted that he was not subject to a binding contract. However, such pre-performance requirements are not conditions precedent
to the formation of a contract. The contract comes into existence when
the contracting officer accepts the bid and mails the contract to the
contractor. The attempted revocation or rescission of the contract in
this instance was held ineffective.
In Affiliated Metal Products Co., 5° the contractor advised the contracting officer that, because of certain losses, he was reluctant to take
further risks without knowing whether the items to be produced would
be acceptable. The contracting officer determined that the problems encountered were caused by shortcomings in the contractor's manufacturing method and sources of supply. Based on this analysis, the contracting officer invoked the default termination clause for non-performance.
The board disregarded the contractor's contention that the government's
failure specifically to identify the nature of the alleged deficiencies in
the manufacturing process had forced the contractor to analyze his entire process in order to identify the reasons for delay. It was held that
there had been a repudiation and failure of performance; consequently,
148. GSBCA No. 3218, 71-1 B.C.A. 1 8871.
8872.
149. GSBCA No. 3333, 71-1 B.C.A.
150. ASBCA No. 15567, 71-2 B.C.A. 8947.
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in the absence of a showing that the contractor's failure was beyond his
control, the termination for default was proper.
The result in Giller Tool Co. 51 is more questionable. The contractor
had been awarded a contract to supply socket wrenches. Subsequently,
he was awarded another contract to supply the same item. The contractor agreed to accelerate the delivery schedule of one contract in consideration for the agency's agreement to extend the delivery date on
certain other contracts. Because of the accelerated delivery schedule,
however, the contractor was unable to meet the requirements of both
contracts. Recognizing this, he diverted the items under one contract
to meet the requirements under the accelerated contract. In doing so,
he had hoped for an extension of the delivery schedule of the earlier
contract, but the extension was not granted. The board held that the
contractor should have been able to meet the demands of both contracts
at the same time. It was noted that when the contractor resorted to diverting wrenches to meet the requirements of the accelerated contract,
without assuring himself that the performance period of the earlier contract would be extended, he assumed the consequences of his decision.
However, had the contractor waited until the agency directed acceleration, he might have had a far stronger basis on which to attempt to
overturn the default termination of the later deliveries.
The primary question in the area of default of government contracts
is whether the contractor's performance was proper. The contractor
must supply that which he has agreed to supply. The government is
not obligated to accept a contractor's unilateral proposal for a change in
specifications or the method of performance, even if the contractor can
show a saving and is completely convinced of the validity of his position. Therefore, a failure to perform because the government will not
acquiesce in a change is a valid basis for termination for default.0 2 An
unauthorized unilateral deviation from specifications may lead to the
same result.153 Many cases decided during 1971 and 1972 involved

clear failures of performance or failures to make progress toward com154
pletion, with the outcome of the appeals readily predictable.
151. GSBCA No. 3282, 71-2 B.C.A.
8932.
152. Karlton Instruments, Inc., GSBCA No. 3293, 71-2 B.C.A. $ 9179.
153. Comp. GEN. B-170873 (April 8, 1971). See Eastern South Dakota Painting
Contractors, GSBCA No. 3316, 72-2 B.C.A. 9665.
154. Hughes De Santa Fe, ASBCA No. 15881, 72-2 B.C.A.
9725 (of concurrent
delays, contractor's were more serious); Empresas Electronicas Walser, Inc., DOT
CAB No. 72-22, 72-2 B.C.A.
9712; Dynamic Systems Inel, Ltd., GSBCA No. 3668,
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H. Abandonment of the Contract
Although there are numerous situations in private or commercial contracting in which a contractor would be justified in abandoning his
contract, similar fact patterns may not convey the same right to a contractor dealing with the government. The instances in which a contractor has "walked-off" a government job and escaped liability are extremely rare; 15 recently only two contractors have been successful in pursuing such a course of action.
9705 (failure to remove surplus sale items); Comspace Corp., GSBCA
72-2 B.C.A.
9674; General Prod. Corp., ASBCA No. 16658, 72-2 B.C.A.
No. 3550, 72-2 B.C.A.
t 9629; Boston Pneumatics, Inc., GSBCA No. 3148, 72-2 B.C.A. 9617 (failure timely
to deliver conforming items or have items ready for inspection); Swanson Eng'r,
ASBCA No. 16353, 72-2 B.C.A. 1 9603; Western Appraisals & Surveys, AGBCA No.
284, 72-2 B.C.A. 1 9597 (failure to attain rate of progress to assure completion within
anticipated planting season); Community Window Shade Co., ASBCA Nos. 13675 &
14048, 72-2 B.C.A. 9587 (failure to make submittals and obtain written approval of
work); E&G Indus., ASBCA No. 16283, 72-2 B.C.A. 9561; M.D. Willner, DOT CAB
No. 72-3, 72-2 B.C.A. 1 9548 (shoddy procurement methods); Rio Hondo Containers,
Inc., GSBCA No. 3494, 72-2 B.C.A. 9514; Shamrock Indus. Maintenance, DOT CAB
No. 72-11, 72-2 B.C.A. 1 9482 (failure properly to supervise work); Union Wholesale
9652 (tender of rebuilt parts in lieu of new
Distrib., PSBCA No. 3, 72-2 B.C.A.
ones); Beach Architectural Prod., ASBCA No. 16179, 72-1 B.C.A. 9374 (contractor
overlooked delivery date); Associated Aero Science Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA No.
15831, 72-1 B.C.A. 9333, 14 G.C. 276 (failure to supply qualified instructors); Ventilation Cleaning Eng'rs., Inc., ASBCA No. 14747, 72-1 B.C.A. 9244 (late work with
unqualified staff and inadequate equipment); Central Tool & Mfg. Corp., ASBCA No.
9309 (subcontractor's re15965, 72-1 B.C.A. 9198, on reconsideratlon, 72-1 B.C.A.
fusal to use prime contractor's letter of credit to ship goods); Arjay Mach. Co,
9165 (failure to supply product conforming techASBCA No. 16072, 71-2 B.C.A.
nically to contract drawings); Interamerican Chem., Inc., ASBCA No. 15080, 71-2
9135 (excusable delay occurred after default); Sanders Indus., ENG BCA
B.C.A.
9072 (failure to make delivery after contracting officer
No. 3244, 71-2 B.C.A.
promptly replied to modification request); Blake Constr. Co., GSBCA Nos. 2456 & 2593,
71-2 B.C.A. 9045 (failure to furnish qualified supplier after notice to do so); ElectroMagnetic Measurements Co, NASA BCA No. 1067-36, 71-2 B.C.A. T 9043 (no test
data to show contractor's system worked before or after alleged excusable delay);
8986 (failure to be available for recall
John Eline, ASBCA No. 15803, 71-2 B.C.A.
8843
of warehoused goods); Marshall Elec. Co., ASBCA No. 14565, 71-1 B.C.A.
(alleged change in quality control was sanctioned by specifications); William F. Klin8842 (damage to the
gensmith, Inc., IBCA Nos. 717-5-68 & 734-10-68, 71-1 B.C.A.
work by children was contractor's risk); Donald R. Schlueter, GSBCA No. 3232, 71-1
B.C.A. 8700 (unexplained failure to do any work within 10 days of completion date);
Force Constr. Co., GSBCA No. 3163, 71-1 B.C.A. 8664 (uncontested evidence demonstrated performance failure); International Harwood Co., GSBCA No. 3060, 71-1
B.C.A. 8613, reconsideration denied, 71-1 B.C.A. 8718 (failure to furnish evidence
of performance as requested by warning letter).
155. See, e.g., Pigeon v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 167 (1892).
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In Building Contractors, Inc., 156 the contractor's refusal to perform
was held not to give the government a ground for declaring a default.
The contractor had ceased performance when the government took
beneficial possession of the work pursuant to a "Use and Possession Prior
to Completion" clause in the contract. The government's resident engineer had inspected and accepted the work in question-a pipeline;
six days later, he had approved payment for the installation in accordance
with the specifications. However, some six months later, leaks in the
pipe were discovered. All the evidence indicated that the contractor had
completed the contract according to its requirements, and there was
no evidence which established latent defects. Nevertheless, the contracting officer directed the contractor to perform corrective work
without additional compensation. Following the contractor's refusal
to do so, the contract was terminated for default. The board held that
use and possession of the line constituted conclusive acceptance of the
work by the government. The contractor's refusal to replace or reperform work which had been performed in accordance with contract
specifications was held not to constitute a ground for default, especially
since a conclusive acceptance had been shown by beneficial use and occupancy, inspection, and acceptance by the engineer. The government
failed to establish a latent defect, fraud, or a gross mistake, and the
termination was converted to one for the convenience of the government.
HenpsteadMaintenanceService, Inc.157 involved a contract to provide
cleaning services in government buildings. Upon discovering that certain windows to be cleaned could not be opened without using tools,
the contractor decided that it would be useless to spend 15 minutes
trying to open windows when it took only three minutes to clean them.
Presumably, the contractor balanced the financial aspect of doing the
work under these difficult conditions against the danger of a default
termination. After the contractor refused to continue performing unless the government placed all the windows in working order, the government, predictably, declared him in default. The board held the
contractor's default excusable on the ground that the government had
a duty to disclose to bidders any unusual characteristics of the job which
could be expected to impede contract performance. The evidence clearly indicated that the government had not disclosed information concern156. ASBCA Nos. 14840 & 15221, 71-1 B.C.A. 8884, 13 G.C.
157. GSBCA No. 3127, 71-1 B.CA. 8809, 13 G.C. 325.
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ing the characteristics of the windows. The government attempted to
counter the non-disclosure argument by urging that the contractor
should have discovered the defects in a pre-bid investigation. The board
disagreed, finding that the contractor's access to the windows during the
inspection was blocked by obstacles and that, although he did not test
to see if the windows opened, the contractor had the right to assume
that they would operate in a normal fashion. The case is unusual inasmuch as the contractor escaped liability in the face of his refusal to
continue performance and in spite of the fact that the standard "Disputes" clause required him to do so.
Absent such special considerations, however, a contractor who stops
work and removes his equipment from the job clearly has failed to
perform. 158 Such conduct constitutes an abandonment of the contract
and justifies a summary default termination. The same result may follow
if the contractor does not coordinate his work with that of another contractor. In Ha-waiiFence and Iron Works, 59 the necessity for coordination of the work was quite clear, since the combined work was the laying of a concrete wall upon which fencing was to be installed. However, as late as one week before the scheduled completion date, the fence
contractor had made no attempt to coordinate his work with that of the
concrete contractor. The board held that the failure of the fence contractor to coordinate constituted an abandonment or an anticipatory
breach of contract and justified termination.
Subsequent vindication of the contractor on a claim does not excuse
an abandonment. In Mai Huu An Co., "0° the contractor refused to continue performance after the contracting officer had advised him that
there would be no adjustment in price for a tax increase levied during
performance. The advice was erroneous-a clause in the contract provided for such relief. However, because the "Dispute" clause of the
contract required continued performance pending resolution of disputes, the contractor's abandonment of the work was held improper
and the government's termination for default upheld.
In American Dredging Co.161 and NASCO Products Corp.,1 2 the
contractors had been involved in disputes with the government involving changed conditions and changes claims, respectively. Both con158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Clean Sweep, Inc., ENG BCA Nos. 2967, 3020, 71-1 B.C.A.
8690.
ASBCA No. 15242, 71-1 B.C.A.
8874.
ASBCA No. 14953, 71-1 B.CA.
ENG BCA No. 2920, 72-1 B.C.A. 9316, 14 G.C. t 320.
VACAB Nos. 974, 1000, 72-2 B.C.A. 9556, 14 G.C. 422.

8701.
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tractors declined to proceed diligently with the work and were declared
in default. In the overwhelming majority of instances, contractors are
required to continue performance even though a real dispute exists and
even if it is shown ultimately that the position of the contractor was
correct. Clearly, the contractor is at a severe disadvantage because of
the manner in which standard form contracts are drafted. The cases
in which a contractor has refused to perform and yet escaped. liability
are so few that little reliance should be placed on them. Contractors
would be well-advised to continue performance and hope to prevail on
appeal.
It is not necessary that a contractor abandon performance before the
government justifiably may terminate the contract. An admission of inability to perform, even in the face of some 'effort to perform, may be
treated as an anticipatory repudiation of the contract. 163 However, the
vast majority of cases involve contractors who have stopped performance for invalid reasons.""
1. Notice Problems
Even though the right to terminate for default may be unquestioned in
a given case, the manner in which such right was exercised may provide
a basis for overturning the default. Often the question is whether notice
163. See, e.g., Charles J. Slicklen Co., GSBCA No. 3566, 72-2 B.C.A. 9666 (letters to
government indicating inability to perform because of suppliers); Pacific Electro
9380 (statement of inability to
Dynamics, Inc., ASBCA No. 16805, 72-1 B.C.A.
perform because of financial problems); Sparkadyne, Inc., ASBCA No. 15162, 71-1 B.C.A.
8854 (unequivocal statement of cessation of business is repudiation); Hydro-Space
274 (contractor
8739, 13 G.C.
Systems Corp., ASBCA No. 15275, 71-1 B.C.A.
suspended work stating he was no longer able to perform).
9671
164. See, e.g, Airmotive Suppliers Corp., ASBCA No. 16333, 72-2 B.C.A.
(refusal to perform because subcontract too expensive); Urban Indus. Corp., GSBCA
No. 3050, 72-2 B.C.A. t 9604, 14 G.C. t 421 (refusal to furnish bonds and execute con9585 (refusal to
tract); Marble Cliff Quarries Co., ASBCA No. 16875, 72-2 B.C.A.
furnish reasonable amounts under requirements contract); James G. Henderson,
9567 (abandonment pending dispute); Mercantile
ASBCA No. 15353, 72-2 B.C.A.
9560 (walk-off by unpaid
Bldg. Maintenance Co., ASBCA No. 16953, 72-2 B.C.A.
9452 (refusal
employees); Clinical Supply Corp., ASBCA No. 15466, 72-1 B.C.A.
to perform two contracts pending resolution of warranty problem on third); Charles
Bainbridge, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 15843 & 16204, 72-1 B.C.A. 9351 (stopped work over
specification dispute); LTD Indus. Corp., ASBCA Nos. 16565 & 16886, 72-1 B.C.A.
9332 (refusal to perform unless given price increase for existing specification); Lone
Star Textiles, Inc., ASBCA No. 16089, 72-1 B.CA. T 9294 (abandonment because of
9199, 14 G.C. t 82
bankruptcy); Giannini-Voltex, ASBCA No. 15077, 72-1 B.C.A.
(lack of intention to perform and financial difficulties).
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was given and, if so, whether it was proper notice under a particular
clause. The appropriateness and significance of contractual notices are
dependent on the type of default as well as the type of contract. Most
cases deal not with the actual notice of termination, but with pre-default
letters and cure notices. There is no requirement for a cure notice
under Standard Form 23-A for construction contracts; 6 5 however,
progress failures under supply contracts, in contrast to performance
07
failures, 166 do require a cure notice of at least 10 days.
In Norfolk Air ConditioningService & Equipment Corp.,68 termination was made prior to a contractually required delivery date because
of a progress failure. The contract in question provided for the supply
of a condensing unit and an evaporator, and the contractor was to
submit equipment data prior to performance. The initial data submission was inadequate, and a conference with the government was held to
resolve discrepancies between the data and the contract specifications.
A second submission, which would have formed the basis for performance, indicated a forthcoming delivery of clearly non-conforming
supplies. The second submission letter, however, requested a price adjustment. This request, oddly enough, was regarded as an anticipatory
breach of contract and the contract was terminated for default. The
board followed the general rule that a default action prior to the performance date, where the reason is the contractor's failure to make adequate progress, requires both a prior cure notice and convincing proof
that timely performance was beyond the reach of the contractor. Since
no cure notice had been furnished to the contractor, the board ordered
the termination converted to one for the convenience of the government. The decision demonstrates that, although a contractor may be
in default, the government may lose its rights by failing to implement
the default action properly. 69 The government's contention that the
request for a price adjustment was a repudiation or anticipatory breach
was without foundation, since a request for an equitable adjustment is
not, by itself, clear and unmistakable evidence of a refusal or inability
to perform. The board quite properly held that even though the con165. See note 1 supra.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. ASBCA Nos. 14080 & 14244, 71-1 B.CA. 8617, 13 G.C. 243.
169. See H. Lynn Williams,- AGBCA No. 301, 72-2 B.C.A.
9708 (unwritten cure
notice vitiates default).
"
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tractor thought that he was entitled to an upward price adjustment,
and even though he was mistaken in such a belief, his request was not a
repudiation. To hold otherwise would result in drastic consequences
in almost all government contracts.
Hedlund Lumber Sales, Inc. 70° demonstrates a proper handling of the
notice requirement. The contract was terminated for the contractor's
failure to supply lumber. The defaulted contractor contended that the
government failed to give proper notice of its intent to terminate and
of its intent to deny a request for a time extension. On the date delivery
was to have been made, the contractor received notice that its previous
request for a time extension had been denied and that the government
intended to terminate the contract. Although the government had taken
12 days to respond to the request for a time extension, the board held
the default termination proper, since the government's delay did not
cause the contractor's performance delay. It should be noted that in
the absence of a showing of waiver, the performance failure in Hedlund
would have justified a default termination without notice. Another
issue raised in the case was whether there had been an assignment of
the proceeds of the contract by the contractor. Although the board
was unable to determine whether the assignment had been made before
the time the termination notice was sent to the contractor, it held that,
even had there been such an assignment, the government was not required to give notice of termination to the assignee.

International Telephone & Telegraph v. United States'71 was not,
strictly speaking, a termination case. However, the decision illustrates
that the government must comply strictly with the notice requirements
of its contracts, regardless of whether its desire is to default a contractor
or to require him to continue performance. In ITT, the government
alleged that oral notice and a follow-up telex were sufficient to require
ITT to continue performance. The court held, however, that the telex
notice was untimely and that the oral notice did not comply with the
contract requirements for a written notice. Thus, it was held that ITT
was not required to perform without a price increase.
However, the government is not required to give a cure notice in every
instance, even though such notice technically could be required. For
example, the boards will not require the government to perform a useless
170. ASBCA No. 14815, 71-1 B.C.A. 8782, 13 G.C.
171. Ct. C1. No. 147-40, 14 G.C. 87 (1972).
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act; consequently, no cure notice is required if the failure cannot be
87
cured' 72 or if it is clear that the goods or supplies are non-conforming.
Furthermore, after a cure notice has been given, it is unnecessary for the
government to wait until the cure period has expired before terminating
the contract. 74 Thus, proof that the government's handling of notice
requirements was not technically proper may not be dispositive of a
case against a contractor.
]. PreproductionFailures
Preproduction and preperformance submittals and testing are becoming more common in government contracts, particularly those in
the supply area. Often, before production can begin, preproduction
samples, data, or reports must be submitted. The effect of a failure at
this stage of the contract may be quite significant; however, as with the
question of notice, the determination whether a preproduction failure
was a proper basis for a default termination may be highly technical
and complicated.
e 7
Argent Industries, IncY
.
reaffirmed the rule announced in Radiation
Technology v. United States. 7 6 In Argent, complex electronic equipment which had been submitted pursuant to the first article approval
provision of the contract was found to have some very minor defects.
The government's default termination was held improper because none
of the defects could, by any reasonable standard, be considered major,
and most were easily correctable. This holding followed the principle
established in Radiation Technology, where the Court of Claims indicated that a contractor has the right to cure a preproduction defect if
the defect is minor and if it is correctable within a reasonable time. The
defects in Argent met this requirement, and the board indicated that
defects under the first article provision are now to be examined in light
of the test enunciated in Radiation Technology. The result is both fair
and practical. In dealing with first article and preproduction clauses,
172. See. e.g., Meyer Labs, Inc., ASBCA No. 17335, 72-2 B.C.A.
9643; Building
Maintenance Specialties, Inc., DOT CAB No. 71-35, 72-2 B.C.A. 9553; Porter Constr,
Inc., ASBCA No. 16178, 72-1 B.C.A. 1 9372.
173. See, e.g., Metal-Tech, Inc, ASBCA No. 14828, 72-2 B.C.A. 9545.
174. See, e.g., Comv. Ga. B-160976 (June 12, 1972) (new failures by contractor
justified default seven days after issuance of 10-day cure notice).
175. ASBCA No. 15207, 71-2 B.C.A. 9172, 14 G.C. 53.
See Astro Science Corp. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 175-69 (Commissioner's Report filed September 28, 1971).
176. 366 F.2d 1003 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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the government's right to demand that for which it bargained must be
balanced against the inequities of a hyper-technical application of the
government's default rights. However, first article testing is not merely
for the purpose of showing the contractor's general ability to perform.
If the first articles constitute delivery of production items, the contractor cannot, with impunity, submit items clearly not in conformity with
177
the specifications.
In the application of first article and preproduction clauses, the parties
also must be mindful of the technical requirements of the clauses. In
Mizdeco Corp.,178 the contractor submitted the required preproduction
engineering and test reports, but the government took an unreasonable
time in approving these predelivery submittals. Since the contractor
could not commence production until he had received full approval, his
subsequent delays were held excusable.
Conversely, in Ace Electronics Associates, Inc., 179 the government
failed to give written notice of its action on the contractor's first article
test submittal until far beyond the time established in the contract for
such notice. However, before the contractor received the notice of deficiencies in the first articles, he undertook steps to complete performance
on the production units under the contract. The termination for default
was held proper, even though the contractor had been encouraged by
government personnel to perform, since the first article clause of the
contract specifically stated that a contractor proceeding with production prior to approval did so at his own risk. Moreover, the contractor
had failed to avail himself of his contractual right to inquire of the
contracting officer the reasons for the government's delay in acting on
the submittal. It may be argued that the case disregards the potential
uncompensated time that a contractor will expend under such circumstances, and also disregards the eagerness of a contractor to please his
customer. Although a rebuttal might be that the contractor has other
rights under the contract, perhaps even to claim a suspension of work,
such an argument overlooks the fact that such a claim would be specula177. See, e.g., Bardeen Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 14381, 71-2 B.C.A. t 9007.
In Electro-Neutronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 12947, 71-2 B.CA. 8961, 13 G.C. 377, the
board rejected the contractor's argument that first article testing was only for the purpose of demonstrating the contractor's ability to perform, and not to obtain items conforming exactly with the specifications. Valid tests showed clear non-conformance,
and the termination for default was upheld.
178. ASBCA No. 15877, 71-2 B.C.A. 9083.
8696.
179. ASBCA Nos. 14676 & 14826, 71-1 B.CA.
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tive and contingent, and that the contractor would face a long, arduous
appeal in order to recover.
Many of the cases involving preproduction issues are more straightforward. As with routin'e production tests, first article tests which show
that the product would not satisfy the contract's specifications justify
a termination for default. 80 It is not an abuse of discretion for a contracting officer to refuse to allow correction of demonstrated material
defects."" Obviously, a failure to make timely delivery of preproduction
samples 82 or rests'83 invites a default termination. Any incidental value
the government may receive from the contractor's efforts is imma184
terial.

K. Bid Problems Causing Default
It has become firmly established that the Boards of Contract Appeals
lack jurisdiction to reform contracts. As a result, and as more lawyers
become expert in the field of government contracts, the number of
appeals involving mistakes in bidding and resulting in default terminations has continued to decrease.
Occasionally, a contractor does obtain relief.' 5 Usually, however,
the contractor will be held responsible for mistakes on a bid which
have resulted in performance problems. 86 Thus, if the contractor has
financial difficulties because of underbids, he must perform or risk a
termination for default. 87 Similarly, a mistake in computing a bid price
does not excuse a default, even though the government makes a mistake
in payment.8 8 An attempt to withdraw a bid on an alleged mistake
180. Pariser Machinery Corp., ASBCA No. 15553, 72-1 B.C.A. 9194, 14 G.C. 165.
181. Standard-Thomson Corp, ASBCA No. 15772, 72-1 B.C.A. 9220; Consolidated
Machine Corp., ASBCA Nos. 14176 & 14366, 72-1 B.C.A. 9212.
182. S. Tyroler Mfg. Co., GSBCA No. 3289, 71-2 B.C.A. 9126, 14 G.C. V 46; Systems
& Components, ASBCA No. 16984, 72-2 B.C.A. 9697.
183. See, e.g., Applied Scientific Prod. & Research, ASBCA No. 17244, 72-1 B.C.A.
9428 (inability to meet specifications and loss of a key employee do not excuse first
article failure).
184. U.B. Corp., ASBCA No. 16556, 72-1 B.C.A.
9284.
185. CoM. GEN. B-175613 (June 1, 1972) (GAO recommended that the contract
be cancelled without liability because the government contributed to the contractor's
mistake in quoting his bid price).
186. Of the five cases the authors classified under the heading of bid problems, the
contractor was unsuccessful in four.
187. S & S Vending Mach. Co., ASBCA No. 15106, 71-2 B.C.A.
9033.
188. Campbell Keypunch Service, GSBCA No. 3123, 71-1 B.C.A.
8800.
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after the contract has been formed or a subsequent refusal to perform
are also grounds for a default termination. 189

L. Labor Problems
Although strikes are among the enumerated events which may excuse
a delay in performance, not every strike or labor problem can be relied
upon successfully to excuse a default. 9" 0 It is the smaller contractor, in
particular, who frequently has been unable to utilize labor problems
as a defense to default terminations. For example, in Harold Leloeuf
9 1 it was held that the contractor was not subBusiness Machines, Inc.,"
ject to a general strike or labor problems sufficient to excuse nonperformance, even though the contractor's entire work force of two men
had quit. It was necessary to show more than the mere existence of a
strike. For example, if a strike involves a contract other than the one
terminated for default, a board can find that the delay on the defaulted
contract was inexcusable because there was no causal connection between the strike and the terminated contract. Thus, in Pacific Sandblast
Equipment Co.,192 the board held that in the absence of a clear showing
that the strike delayed performance of the terminated contract, the delay
was not excusable. However, the result in cases of this type may be
questioned if the same employees are performing both contracts. Generally, a strike is against an -employer and not a particular contract. It is
submitted that judicial scrutiny of the contractor's production methods,
and determinations of whether the contractor could have avoided the
effects of the strike by an earlier commencement of performance, overlook the reality that a strike usually is designed to paralyze an employer's
total operational capacity.
However, a refusal to overturn a default termination has more support where a contractor contends that the default was excusable because
of a strike against his suppliers. For example, in Boston Pneumatics,
Inc., 93 the board determined that although the strike against the contractor's suppliers may have caused the initial delays, the contractor
had not shown the strike to be the operative cause of his own default.
189. Keystone Bolt & Nut Corp., GSBCA No. 3544, 72-1 B.C.A.
9392, on reconsideration,72-2 B.C.A. 9701; Kodawood Furniture Mfrs., Inc., GSBCA No. 3043, 71-1
B.C.A. 8614.
190. See, e.g., Indian Prod. Co., GSBCA No. 3420, 71-2 B.C.A.
9178; see note 19
supra.
191. GSBCA No. 3304, 71-1 B.C.A. 8732.
192. ASBCA No. 15565, 71-2 B.C.A.
8942.
193. ASBCA Nos. 15167 & 15635, 71-1 B.C.A. 8918.
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This rationale is an outgrowth of the "beyond the control and without
the fault or negligence of the Contractor" language of the excusable
delay clause. 94 It is incumbent on a contractor to assure himself that
he has adequate personnel and an adequate source of supply. It is only
under unusual circumstances that a contractor may be successful in attributing his failure to a lack of personnel. 95
It should be emphasized that the requisite evidence, not only in a labor
problem but in all cases where the contractor alleges an excusable cause
of delay, must be supplied by the contractor. 9 " Many contractors apparently have adopted the attitude that the nere occurrence of a strike
is ipso facto an excusable cause of delay. However, before he can be
relieved of the onus of a default termination, the contractor must show
that the event was beyond his control and without his fault or negligence,
197
and that such event actually delayed his performance.
M. Waiver of the Default
It is possible to find that the government has waived its right to declare
a contractor in default. Most waiver cases involve the contractual requirement of timely delivery or completion. Typically, the government
has permitted the contractor to continue performance beyond the established date and to expend additional money. In effect, the government
has elected to obtain continued performance, and the contractor has
relied upon this election to his detriment. Consequently, it may be held
unfair to allow termination after such election, unless a new delivery or
completion date has been 'established and not met.
For example, in Al Green, Inc. 1 a default termination was held improper because the government had permitted the contractor to perform
beyond the scheduled performance date and had failed to fix a new
reasonable performance date. Four days after the original completion
194. See note 19 supra.
195. In Products Eng'r Corp., GSBCA No. 3479, 72-2 B.CA. 9627, impending steel
and existing dock strikes were held to be excusable delays, However, most contractors
during the past two years were unsuccessful on labor issues. For example, in Duralab
Equip. Corp., GSBCA No. 3412, 72-1 B.C.A.
9365, an unusual turnover in skilled
help was not an excusable delay.
196. Udom Sangchareon Co, ASBCA No. 14976, 71-1 B.C.A. 8855.
197. See, e.g., Whitlock-Dunn, Inc., GSBCA No. 3355, 72-2 B.C.A.
9594 (failure
t6 prove that strike at another company delayed performance); Woodford Hardware
Co., ASBCA No. 16062, 72-1 B.C.A. 9445 (no evidence that strike affected contractor's
ability to obtain raw materials).
198. ASBCA No. 15225, 71-1 B.C.A. 8789.
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date, the contracting officer had directed the contractor to continue
performance but had failed to set a new completion date. At the time
of his action, the contracting officer not only had full knowledge that
the specified date had passed, but also knew that completion of the contract would require further commitments by the contractor for labor
and materials. Under these circumstances, it was held that the contracting officer had the duty to establish a new reasonable time for completion of the work. By inducing the contractor to continue performance and by delaying termination for more than three months after the
original performance date, the government was held to have waived its
right to terminate for default. Consequently, the termination was converted to one for the convenience of the government.
. H.N. Bailey & Associates v. United States'99 involved a waiver issue
complicated by a first article clause. The court interpreted the default
rights in the first article test submittal clause as a departure from the usual
default clause. The clause was held to allow the government, upon a,
finding of defective performance, either to declare a default immediately
or to notify the contractor of the defects, extend the time, and call for
resubmission within 15 days. However, if the second submission failed,
the contractor would be in default, the contracting officer not having
the discretionary power to re-extend the time for a third submission. In
Bailey, the government merely notified the contractor of defects in performance. Since the notice was not accompanied by a default termination, the government was held to have elected to allow the contractor
to make the second submission. The default therefore was held improper. In response to the government's argument that the contracting
officer should have a reasonable amount of time to decide on a proper
course of action, the court applied the accepted rule that a reasonable
time must be determined in light of the particular contract provisions.
Although recognizing that under the ordinary default clause a failure
to declare a default immediately upon learning of a defect would not
constitute a waiver, the court found that the default provision in the
first article approval clause was much more stringent than those in the
standard default clause. Applying a rule of strict construction against
the government, the court held that by not declaring a default within
15 days after the accrual of this right, the government had waived its
right to terminate unless and until the testing of a second submission
proved the product to be unsatsifactory.
199. 196 Ct. CI. 156, 13 G C.

439 (1971).
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The court in Bailey also dealt with an infrequently mentioned problem in contract administration. It is the customary administrative practice to transfer termination questions from the administrative or procuring contracting officer to a termination contracting officer. 200 The
government apparently argued that this transfer of function required
time in order for the successor contracting officer to review the file, acquaint himself with all the salient facts, gather additional pertinent information, and obtain the advice of his technical and legal assistants.
The court disposed of this argument stating:
The trial commissioner's proposed opinion touched off the discussion by counsel of the propriety of defendant's internal arrangements by which the case went from the previous contracting officer to a "Termination Contracting Officer" for the decision to
terminate for default and the act of terminating. Our conclusion
that plaintiff was not in default moots this issue, for a termination
by the original Contracting Officer would have been just as bad.
On the other hand, a contract demanding compliance with a tight
schedule, on pain of sudden default, requires a like tightness in the
government's decision making. The contractor is not to be deemed
to have acquiesced in or to have foreseen delays that might be
caused by the new man's having to act in a manner with which he
was previously unfamiliar, whether or not plaintiff had legal notice
of the regulations involved. 201
Although the court's comments were not necessary to its decision on
the default question, the statement is instructive. Considerations of the
manner in which the government terminates a contract and the necessity
of a reasonable time in which to make that decision were found not to
override the stringent default provisions in the first article approval
clause. It is possible that the court's statement could have a wider application to the standard default clause, where it generally has been accepted that the government has a reasonable time to decide upon a course
of action. However, if the court's comments in Bailey are extended to
the standard default clause, then a delay in terminating which is traceable
solely to a transfer of function from one contracting officer to another,
and which was not a result of the evaluation itself, may be unreasonable
to the extent the contractor has been prejudiced.
200. See, e.g., ASPR 1.201.3.
201. 196 Ct. C1. at 156.
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The effect on the contractor of the government's conduct is critical to the issue of waiver. Thus, the encouraging of continued performance may support a finding of waiver; 20 2 conveying the impression
that time is not an important factor may produce the same result. 0 3 For
example, in Simplex Manufacturing Corp.,2°4 the delivery date was held
to have been extended as a result of the conduct of the parties. However, the mere fact that an original delivery or completion has been
waived may not be dispositive of the question of propriety of a default
termination, since an admission of inability to perform, even in the face
of an effort to perform, is a repudiation of the contract. Thus, the contractor's failure to make progress in Simplex was held to have demonstrated a clear likelihood of an inability to perform; consequently, the default was proper. Similarly, a waiver may not be sufficient to overturn
a default termination if the contractor subsequently abandons performance,205 fails to make sufficient progress after a waiver, 0 6 or delivers non207
conforming supplies.
A factor which may contribute to the difficulty encountered by contractors on the issue of waiver 0 8 is the concept of forebearance. The
government is entitled to a reasonable time after a default to make a
decision whether to terminate. 0 9 During this period of forebearance,
the government's failure to terminate is a matter of grace and does not
constitute a waiver. Forebearance problems are peculiarly dependent
upon the facts of individual cases. A contractor must evaluate the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to appeal. Pertinent considerations may include the reasonableness of the government's delay
202. See, e.g., New Jersey Mfg. Co, ASBCA No. 15216, 72-1 B.C.A. 9420.
203. See, e.g., Baifield Indus., Division of A-T-O, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 14582 & 14583,
72-2 B.C.A. 9676 (government's conduct manifested a lack of concern with the delivery
schedule, and the contractor was induced to continue performance); Globe Constr. Co.,
ASBCA No. 13316, 71-2 B.C.A. 9123 (government and contractor abrogated "time is
of the essence" provision).
204. ASBCA Nos. 13897 & 14380, 71-1 B.C.A. 8814.
205. Universal Fiberglass Corp., GSBCA No. 2266, 71-1 B.CA. 8901, reconsideration
denied, 71-2 B.C.A. 9019.
149; Intertech
9215, 14 G.C.
206. Airco Eng'rs, AGBCA No. 245, 72-1 B.C.A.
Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 14960, 71-1 B.C.A.
8897.
9233,
207. Renwin Metal Prod, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 15413 & 15717, 72-1 B.C.A.
reconsiderationdenied, 72-1 B.C.A. 9329; Phil Rich Fan Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 12770,
71-1 B.C.A. 8694.
208. In the 32 cases dealing primarily with waiver during 1971 and 1972, six contractors were successful and 26 were not.
209. Temco, Inc., ASBCA No. 13907, 71-1 B.CA. 8683. But cf. notes 200-01 supra
& accompanying text.
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in defaulting the contract, prejudice suffered by the contractor as a
result of the delay, additional costs or obligations to suppliers and subcontractors incurred by a continuation of performance, and knowledge
by the government of the contractor's actions. There can be no general
rule by which to determine whether there has been a waiver; the passage
of an hour may constitute a waiver in one case, while five months in
2 10
another may not.

The requirement that a new reasonable delivery date be set also can
b'e problematic. For example, Associated A era Science Laboratories,
Inc."' involved a contract contemplating a written agreement between
the parties for the establishment of the contract performance period.
However, the contractor waived the requirement for a written agreement, and the default declared upon his failure to meet the date set by
the government was upheld. Of course, if the government waives a default and unilaterally sets a new reasonable date for completion, the con212
tractor's failure to meet that date will justify a default action.
The failure to take decisive action after the default may not constitute
a waiver if the government has taken other self-protective actions. For
example, it has been held that the issuance after the completion date
of a limited objective cure notice 1 3 or a preliminary default warning
notice 214 effectively prevented a finding of waiver.
One of the necessary elements of a waiver is detrimental reliance by
the contractor on the conduct of the government. In P.J. Hydraulics,
Inc.,215 the government successfully contended and proved that the contractor's extensive efforts to perform were not taken as a result of any
210. Clark Cable Corp., ASBCA No. 17090, 72-1 B.C.A.
9463 (six-working-day
wait was not waiver); Standard Mfg. Co, ASBCA No. 13624, 72-1 B.C.A. 9371, 14
G.C.
280 (40-day delay was not waiver; extensions granted under other contracts
were insufficient to show a course of dealing); Chester Morton Elec, Inc., ASBCA
No. 14904, 72-1 B.C.A.
9185 (17-day wait was forebearance); Gardner Constr. Co.,
DOT CAB No. 71-13, 71-2 B.C.A. 1 9096 (four-month delay in termination was forebearance); Electro-Magnetic Measurements Co., NASA BCA No. 1067-36, 71-2 B.C.A.
9043 (24-day extension based on representation of timely performance was forebearance); Continental Chem. Corp., GSBCA No. 2986, 71-2 B.C.A.
9018, on reconsideration, 71-2 B.C.A.
9154 (termination one month after purchase order's expiration date was forebearance).
211. ASBCA No. 15831, 72-1 B.C.A. 9333, 14 G.C. 276.
212. R. E. Atckison Co., ASBCA Nos. 15896 & 15905, 72-1 B.C.A. 9421.
213. Thomas E. Spicknall, Inc. v. United States, Ct. Cl. Nos. 275-67 & 207-70 (Commissioner's Report filed October 3, 1972).
214. Guenther Systems, Inc, ASBCA No. 14187, 72-2 B.C.A. 9495.
215. ASBCA No. 16310, 72-2 B.C.A. 9524, 14 G.C. 398.
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action or inaction on the part of the government. Accordingly, although
recognizing that the contractor had taken exceptional steps to cure his
default, the board held that the contractor had taken the initiative in performing, and that detrimental reliance on government conduct had not
been present. Thus, the contractor's efforts had been at his own risk
and expense.
The authority of government representatives often is involved in
waiver questions.216 For example, in General Products Corp.,217 the
contractor's misinterpretation of the limits of authority of various government officers was fatal to his appeal. As has been described, 21 when
a termination is in issue, the functions of administering the contract customarily are transferred from an administrative contracting officer
(ACO) or procurement contracting officer (PCO) to a termination
contracting officer (TCO). 219 In a termination, the TCO's determina-

tion normally is dispositive-subject, of course, to review by higher
authority. Thus, it was held that the contractor in General Products
acted at his own risk in relying on statements of the ACO that he would
obtain or recommend a waiver.
A second case styled H. N. Bailey & Associates v. United States220 indicates that the actions of the contractor may have an impact on
the issue of waiver. The contractor argued that there had been
a waiver of the contract delivery schedule. The court noted that,
in the absence of any formal amendment, modification, or other expression of contractual waiver, the question of whether a waiver has
occurred must be resolved by examining the conduct of the parties
prior to final termination. Relying on the fact that the government urgently needed the supplies and was influenced by the contractor's optimistic statements that performance problems had been
resolved and production soon would be forthcoming, the court
held that a 41-day delay after default did not constitute a waiver.
The government's voluntary meeting with the contractor because
of the urgency of the situation was found to be a mere offer of
courteous assistance beyond its contractual obligations. Consequently,
it was held that no waiver could be implied from the defendant's action
at that meeting.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See, e.g., Clark Cable Corp., ASBCA No. 14521, 71-1 B.C.A.
ASBCA No. 16658, 72-2 B.C.A.
9629.
See notes 200-01 supra & accompanying text.
See notes 143-46 supra & accompanying text.
196 Ct. Cl. 166, 13 G.C. 503 (1971).

8748.
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The case was complicated by the fact that on the same day the contract was terminated, an engineering adviser had received a sample from
the contractor and, knowing of the termination, had tested it and reported the negative results. This action was held immaterial to the
waiver issue on the ground that such conduct was consistent with the
government's repeated efforts to aid the contractor. The court characterized the government actions as a "benevolent attitude" not often assumed by the government. To hold that such action constituted a
waiver of default rights could result in the preclusion of any government assistance to contractors beyond that specifically and technically
required by the contract, lest the government unintentionally waive its
default rights 21
I

N. Reprocurement
Since the vast majority of contractors are unsuccessful in overturning
default terminations, it is necessary to examine the grounds which may
be utilized to escape liability for the excess costs of reprocurement. The
default clause provides that the government may reprocure similar
items and charge the contractor in default for excess costs 22 However, as with any administrative procedure, the government must act
with a degree of fairness and dispatch; otherwise, it may lose its right to
charge the contractor for the costs of reprocurement.2 3 In brief, the
government must make the repurchase within a reasonable time after default, obtain a reasonable repurchase price, and attempt to lessen or
221. In Bailey, the government urged the application of a principle established in
Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. United States, 160 Ct. Cl. 437 (1963). The Helene
Curtis, or superior knowledge, doctrine is applicable where the government, knowing
of non-apparent difficulties of performance, permits a contractor to bid on and perform a contract. If the government withholds from the contractor knowledge which
is essential to the successful completion of the contract and it is found unreasonable to
expect the contractor to obtain the information from any other accessible source, the
government may be found to have violated the contract. In Bailey, the contractor
was declared in default because he could not perform required metallurgical processes.
The superior knowledge doctrine was held inapplicable on the ground that the government did not possess knowledge of the metallurgical process; furthermore, any information the contractor needed to fulfill his obligation could have been obtained
from commercial sources.
The contractor also failed to prevail on his argument that the reprocured items varied
from those under the original contract and that, consequently, he should not be assessed reprocurement costs. It was determined that the essential configuration and purpose of the reprocured items was the same as those under the original contract.
222. See note 1 supra.
223. Shamrock Indus. Maintenance, DOT CAB No. 72-11, 72-2 B.C.A. 9482.
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mitigate damages. 224 As a general rule, if the government fails to comply with these requirements, it may lose the right to assess excess costs
to the contractor. 5 What constitutes a reasonable time in which to
award a reprocurement contract is dependent upon the circumstances
of the individual case. 6 The test usually imposed by the various boards
is whether the contractor has been prejudiced by the government's de7
lay in reprocuring the item.22
A contractor in default may contest the government's calculation of
excess costs. In CentralFire Truck Corp.,28 for example, the contractor was held entitled to a reduction in the amount of the excess cost assessment because of the government's failure to reduce the costs to the
full extent made possible by modification in the reprocurement contract.
The parties to the reprocurement contract had agreed to reduce the
price as a result of a waiver of all preproduction testing. In assessing
the costs against the defaulted contractor, the government decreased the
liability of the contractor in default by an amount reflecting only the
waiver of government testing. The board held that the contractor was
entitled to an additional reduction, since the waiver of testing also included rests to be performed by the contractor.
Thus, the government must be prepared to demonstrate that reprocurement costs have been held to a minimum. In the absence of such
proof, the boards have shown a willingness to find in favor of contractors on the issue of reprocurement costs.' 9 For example, in American
Metal FabricatorsCo.,230 the contractor in default produced evidence
that the government recently had awarded a contract for the same item
involved in reprocurement at one-quarter of the price for which the reprocurement contract was issued. The board held that the government
could assess a price no higher than that obtained on the intervening contract. A different result might have obtained had the government proved
2302. See R. NASH AND J.
224. Office Equip. Co., ASBCA No. 5040, 59-2 B.C.A.
Ci3iNic, supra note 14, at 679.
225. American Trans-Coil Corp., ASBCA No. 16651, 72-2 B.C.A. 9544.
226. See, e.g., National Elec. Metal Co., ASBCA No. 14806, 71-1 B.C.A. 1 8839 (four
to five month delay in reprocurement held reasonable).
227. Id.
228. ASBCA No. 12715, 71-2" B.C.A. 8946.
229. See, e.g., Fitzgerald Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 15205 & 15594, 71-2 B.C.A.
9029 (reprocurement costs 40 percent higher than original costs); A&W Gen. Clean8994 (government failed to solicit
ing Contractors, ASBCA No. 14809, 71-2 B.C.A.
second low bidder on original procurement).
8772, 13 G.C. 324.
230. ASBCA No. 12986, 71-1" B.C.A.
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damages suffered under the defaulted contract in addition to the reprocurement costs.
In addition to the requirement of a reasonable price, the government
is required to reprocure items, services, or supplies which are similar
to those which the original contractor was to provide. 23 ' The contractor

is entitled to receive the benefit of changes of -specifications in the reprocurement contract resulting in reduction of costs 2 2 Furthermore,
if the government awards a different kind of contract on reprocurement
(for example, changing a production contract to one for research and
development), then an assessment of excess costs may not be allowed. 33
However, the contracting officer has vast discretion in reprocurement
matters, so long as his decisions meet a standard of reasonableness. 2
The burden is on the government to show that the work has been done
and the reprocurement contractor paid.

35

Completion of and payment

for the work must occur with the intent of utilizing such work as a reprocurement. There is authority to the effect that if a contract is classified as a reprocurement only after it has been awarded, there can be no
assessment for excess reprocurement costs. 236
There have been rare instances in which defaulting contractors or
their affiliates have bid on reprocurement contracts. 237 Although the
government usually rejects such bids or offers,2 8 the fact that a contractor has completed supplies on hand may reduce his damages greatly.
The government need not accept such supplies; however, to the extent
completed supplies are available, the government may not backcharge
a higher price on reprocurement assessments.239
231. See note 1 supra.
232. Land-Air, Inc., ASBCA No. 15091, 71-2 B.C.A. 9086, 14 G.C. 35; Community
Window Shade Co., ASBCA Nos. 13675 & 14048, 72-2 B.C.A. 9587. See note 228
supra and accompanying text.
233. Aerosonic Corp., ASBCA No. 11718, 72-1 B.C.A. 9241, 14 G.C. 314.
234. See notes 50-55 supra & accompanying text.
235. Winchester Screw Mach. Prod., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 15695 & 16011, 72-2 B.C.A.
9538.
236. Taylor Bros., Co, ASBCA No 12710, 68-1 B.C.A.
supra note.14, at 682.

6930; R. NAsa & J. Crm'MC,

9324, 14 G.C. 237;
237. Steelcot Corp., ASBCA Nos. 14029 & 14878, 72-1 B.C.A.
8695.
American Airflow Corp., ASBCA No. 14181, 71-1 B.C.A.
9556, 14 G.C.
238. NASCO Prod. Corp., VACAB Nos. 974 & 1000, 72-2 B.C.A.
422; H&S Oil Co., ASBCA No. 16321, 72-2 B C.A.

14 G.C.

9520; CoMP. GEN. B-171659,

33 (Nov. 15, 1971).

239. Hedlund Lumber Sales, Inc., ASBCA No. 14815, 71-1 B.C.A.
298.

8782, 13 G.C.
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Hydro Fitting Manufacturing Corp.24 ° demonstrates the complicadons which can arise in the reprocurement area. The government had
divided the reprocurement into two contracts; one was awarded on a
regular delivery schedule and the other was placed on an accelerated
delivery schedule with a concomitantly higher price. However, the
accelerated items were delivered subsequent to the regularly scheduled
deliveries. It was held that since, at the time the contracts were awarded,
the contracting officer had based the payment of a premium price for
the accelerated deliveries on a reasonable projection of government
needs, the contractor remained liable for the costs of the accelerated
deliveries. Similarly, but in another context, if the original contract
provided for an alternative but more expensive item, the government has
the option to procure and base its assessment of excess reprocurement
costs on that item.2 41
Although the default of the original contractor does not give the
government a free hand to build up costs or to delay unreasonably in
reprocurement, the contractor will be liable if the government makes
a prima facie showing that its actions were reasonable.Y However,
failure to demonstrate the reasonableness of its conduct may result in
reduction or removal of excess cost liability of the contractor in default.2 43 However, there need not be a formal reprocurement contract
with a third party if there is adequate proof of the reasonableness of the
reprocurement and the costs assessed.2 4
As has been noted,24 5 the termination clause requires reprocurement
of products or work similar to that specified in the defaulted contract.
However, holdings based on dissimilarity are becoming infrequent, insignificant variations in the specifications often being overlooked. 4 It
would appear that similarity is being viewed now more as a matter of
function than of appearance or name. Thus, it has been held that since
pineapple and apple juice are equivalent in nutritional value, it was per240. NASA BCA Nos. 1169-20 & 270-4, 71-2 B.C.A. 9042.
241. Philip Bradley & Sons, AGBCA No. 314, 71-2 B.C A. 9002.
9325, 14
242. R.C. Allen Business Mach., Inc., ASBCA No. 12932, 72-1 B.C.A.
G.C. 264.
9544
243. See, e.g., American Trans-Coil Corp, ASBCA No. 16651, 72-2 B.C.A.
(government unable to provide satisfactory explanation why it did not solicit original
bidders on reprocurement); Marshall Elec. Co., ASBCA No. 14908, 72-1 B.C.A. T 9387,
14 G.C. 1 365.
244. Collins Elec., Inc, ASBCA No. 16956, 72-2 B.C.A. 9542, 14 G.C. 415; R.A.
9409, 14 G.C. 392.
Miller Indus., Inc., ASBCA No. 16433, 72-1 B.C.A.
245. See note 231 supra & accompanying text.
246. See, e g., Rio Hondo Containers, Inc., GSBCA No. 3494, 72-2 B.C.A. 9514.
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missible to reprocure pineapple juice even though the original contract
was for apple juice.4 7 Eventually, however, a point is reached where

similarity cannot be defined effectively in terms of function. For example, two very simple components may be equivalent functionally, but
still require vastly different tools and dies, production runs, and quality
control methods. A reprocurement of the more expensive item would
result in a substantially larger assessment against the contractor in default, if such item is considered similar to the less expensive item required by the original contract. Moreover, it can be argued that a waiver
of specifications on the reprocurement contract may change the nature
of the work or product to such a great extent as to negate similarity. If
so, the contractor should escape all excess cost liability, rather than
simply receiving the benefit of a lower price.
0. Conclusion
Several general observations may be drawn from the recent default
cases. Most significant is the fact that the percentage of successful appeals by contractors continues to decline as the number of cases increase.
Several reasons may b'e suggested for this phenomenon. Undoubtedly, a
significant number of terminations for default result from deficient or
defective performance of contractual obligations. However, the cases
demonstrate that apart from clear failures or refusals to comply with
specifications, many government contractors either misinterpret or do
not fully comprehend the rights and obligations inherent in a government contract. The result is a plethora of needless and often unmeritorious disputes between the contractor and the contracting agency.
Contractor problems frequently result from an inability to perform
coupled with an assumption of risk. For example, contributing to the
increasing number of defaults in supply contracts is the fact that many
such contracts require production of extremely complicated items in
strict conformity with difficult technical specifications. A growing number of government contracts have shifted to the contractor the risk that
he will be unable to perform-even in situations where the bargained-for
service or product is in very early stages of technological development.
Contractors frequently have been unaware that they have assumed this
technical risk.
Finally, contractors, most often those of smaller size, accept contracts
without the financial capability necessary to perform. Often in such
247. Covp'. GEx. B-176472, 14 G.C.

448 (August 7, 1972).
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cases, a default may be attributed to the use of an inappropriate contract payment mechanism: for example, a fixed price contract or a
variation thereof may be employed where a cost reimbursement type
contract more adequately would serve the exigencies of the situation.
Numerous and varied solutions to these individual problems potentially are available. However, a simple starting point toward alleviating
many fundamental difficulties would be improved communications at
the pre-award and preperformance stages in order to insure that all
parties fully understand the obligations required of them.
II.

TERMINATION FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE

GOVERNMENT

Frequently, the government determines that it no longer requires the
work or products for which it has contracted and that its best interests
would be served by terminating the contract in whole or in part. Most
government contracts contain a termination for convenience clause,
which permits the government, under such circumstances, to prevent a
contractor from completing performance of the contract. Before examining recent cases involving terminations for convenience, it is necessary to examine the nature and extent of the right to terminate, which is
conveyed in the following terms:
The performance of work under this contract may be terminated
by the Government in accordance with this clause in 'whole, or
from time to time in part, 'whenever the Contracting Officer shall
determine that such termination is in the best interest of the Government .... 28
The brevity of the language of the clause is somewhat misleading in
light of the breadth of the right conveyed. The Court of Claims has
stated that the clause applies in numerous varied and unspecified situations.2 9 In effect, the clause permits the government to terminate a
contract whenever it feels termination is appropriate. Justifications for
invoking the clause might include a lack of funds, changing needs or
policies, or considerations of foreign relations. For example, the AntiBallistic Missile program recently was curtailed because of the apparent
success of disarmament negotiations.
The termination for convenience clause contractually delineates and
states the right to terminate. However, the power of the government to
248. ASPR § 8-701, (a) (emphasis supplied). See note 2 supra.
249. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. CI. 1963).
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terminate was established by case law long before development of the
contractual right. In 1875, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Corliss Steam-Engine Co. 2 50 that a contracting officer was authorized to

negotiate and settle a terminated contract. With the development of
the termination for convenience clause, however, a question arose concerning the parameters of the government's rights in the absence of
such a clause in the contract. The Court of Claims, in G.L. Christian
and Associates v. United States,51 noted that procurement regulations,
carrying the force and effect of law, required the termination for convenience clause to be included in the contract. Therefore, the court
held that the rights and duties of the parties were governed by the
language of that clause, even though it was not physically a part of the
contract.
Invocation of the termination for convenience clause permits the government to discontinue performance of a contract with only limited
liability.252 If, in a private contract, a party attempts to terminate the

contract without a contractual right to do so, that party would be liable
for breach of contract. However, in a government contract, the termination for convenience clause converts what otherwise would be a
breach into an administrative claim cognizable under the contract; additionally, the clause seriously circumscribes the rights of the contractor,
primarily by limiting the extent of his recovery. Furthermore, the concept of fault is of only minor significance in termination for convenience
cases. Although a small number of contractors have appealed from
terminations for convenience alleging bad faith or arbitrariness, they
have been uniformly unsuccessful. 5 ' Concepts of fault or improper
action usually are related only indirectly to terminations for convenience, most frequently when a wrongful default termination is converted
into one for the convenience of the government.254
A termination for convenience is initiated with a formal termination
notice to the contractor. Thereafter, the contractor's course of action
is governed by provisions of the contract clause2 55 and procurement
regulations. 250 He may be required, for example, to stop work, amass
250. 91 U. S. 321 (1875).
251. 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. C1. 1963).
252. See note 2 supra.

253. See Librach & Cutler v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 605 (1959); R. NASH
Comirc, supra note 14, at 758.

254. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
255. See note 1 supra.
256. ASPR § VIII.
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his inventory, reduce costs, and notify affected subcontractors. Although these requirements may be highly technical, compliance therewith may play an important role in subsequent settlement negotiations.
These negotiations, designed to achieve a fair and just settlement, are
built around the termination settlement proposal submitted by the contractor.257 However, if negotiations break down and the parties cannot agree on a settlement, the contracting officer will issue a unilateral
decision, which is appealable under the "Disputes" clause of the contract.
The cost principles in section 15 of the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations and in the Federal Regulations are applicable in determining
the allowable costs under a termination settlement. Complications may
result if the termination is only partial and the termination clause of the
contract provides that in the event of a partial termination, the contractor is entitled to an equitable adjustment in the price of the continued work.2 58 Moreover, pricing of the terminated portion of the
work often is no less difficult and requires accounting expertise and
detail.
Disputes often arise as to the amount of recoverable profits. As a
general rule, anticipatory profits-those the contractor would have
earned had the contract been performed fully-are not recoverable.25 9
However, as with other disputed costs, recoverable profits are negotiable'based on costs incurred as well as other factors.2 60 Until recently,
the termination for convenience clause contained a formula providing
that a percentage of certain costs would be the maximum profit; that
formula was to be invoked if the parties could not reach a settlement.
However, revisions to the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR). in 1966 and to the Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR)
in 1971 resulted in deletion of the formula from the clause. In the absence of agreement, profit is now determined unilaterally by the contracting officer, using a "fair and reasonable" standard.2 6 ' Unfortunately,
tradition has become entrenched, and the government often bases its
proposals on the six percent maximum profit permitted by the old clause;
257. See note 2 supra.
258. Id.
259. G L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
260. ASPR § 8-703.
261. See note 2 supra.
It should be noted that in defense contracts negotiated prior to 1966 and civilian
contracts awarded prior to 1971, profit still will be computed on the basis of the
formula if negotiations fail.
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most contractors claim a 10 percent profit margin. The present clause
does provide considerable flexibility, however, and it is to the distinct
advantage of the contractor to negotiate a settlement.
Inasmuch as settlement following termination of a large contract may
involve significant expense, recoverability of settlement costs is a question of importance. In general, legal costs incurred in appealing a
termination claim are not recoverable. 2 6 This rule is applicable even
if the purpose of the appeal is to establish the existence of a termination
for convenience, and even though the issue is resolved in favor of the
contractor. 6 3 However, the contractor is entitled to recover the accounting, legal, clerical, and similar costs incurred in the preparation,
presentation, and negotiation of the termination settlement claim, provided such costs are reasonable and properly documented.264
With this abbreviated statement of general principles applicable to
terminations for convenience, it is now possible to examine recent cases
in the area. Termination for convenience cases are not as susceptible of
classification as are cases involving termination for default. However,
it is possible to make a division on the basis of the two issues most
frequently litigated: whether a termination for convenience has occurred, and the amount of the settlement to be allowed the contractor.
A. Establishingthe Terminationfor Convenience
Although the government's discretion to act under the termination for
convenience clause is virtually unlimited, problems often arise in determining whether the government has terminated a contract wrongfully by purporting to act under some other clause or for some other
reason. Typically, in these types of cases, the government discontinues
performance but fails or refuses to classify the termination as one for
convenience, and the contractor must appeal to establish his right to a
settlement.
For example, in T.M.C. Systems and Power Corp.,65 the contractor
was awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract containing a pre-1966 "Limitation of Cost" clause. As the contractor's funds diminished, he forwarded appropriate notices of the extent of his expenditures and a projected timetable for the exhaustion of funds. The government delayed
262. Q.V.S., Inc., ASBCA No. 7513, 1963 B.C.A.
3699.
263. Id.
264. See note 2 supra; see, e.g., Douglas Corp, ASBCA No. 8566, 69-1' B.C.A.
Cryo-Sonics, Inc., ASBCA No. 13219, 70-1 B.C.A.
8313.
265. ASBCA No. 15211, 72-1 B.C.A.
9209, 14 G.C. 10i.
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action on the notices for 17 months and refused to advise the contractor
as to the procedures to be followed in closing out the contract, maintaining that the contract had expired. The contractor considered his
contract to have been terminated for convenience, but the government
refused to act on a termination settlement proposal submitted by him.
On appeal, the contractor argued that the government's failure to take
action after timely notice under the "Limitation of Cost" clause constituted a termination for convenience. The board held that the government delayed unreasonably in responding to the overrun notices and
that, under these circumstances, the contract had not expired under its
own terms. Thus, under limited circumstances, an unreasonable government delay in taking action under the "Limitation of Cost" clause may
26
be deemed a termination for convenience.
T.M.C. Systems and Po'wer may be placed with a group of cases involving constructive terminations; although they are similar in result,
these cases should be distinguished from cases in which an improper
default has been converted to a termination for convenience. The nature
of a constructive termination is exemplified by Henry Angelo & Sony,
lnc. )2 67 where the board rectified a gross inequity perpetrated by the
government. The contractor had been awarded a requirements contract for painting various buildings at a military base. The contract contained a schedule of the estimated quantities of requirements which supposedly were beyond the government's own capacity to perform. The
estimated cost of the work was approximately $520,000, with $120,000
apportionable to the painting of family housing and the remaining
$400,000 allocable to the painting of administrative buildings. Painting
of the housing units was considerably less profitable than the other
work under the contract.
During performance, the government ordered the contractor to perform almost all the less profitable work, while performing most of the
profitable work with its own personnel. The government explained its
action on the basis of the unavailability of funds; however, this particular contract was not subject to the availability of funds. Moreover,
the board found that the government had channeled available funds to
other projects, thereby increasing its capacity to perform the painting
work at the contractor's expense. Noting that a requirements contract
contains an implied condition of good faith, the board held that the
266. Cf. Come. GEN. B-171692 (August 18, 1971) (contract found to have expired
by its own terms).
267. ASBCA No. 15082, 72-1 B.C.A.
9356, 14 G.C. 246.
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government's actions in having the contractor perform only the less
expensive work did not satisfy this standard. To the extent that the
government performed the work itself, the board deemed the government's actions a termination for convenience.
A similar result based on constructive termination was reached in
Maxson Electronics Corp.2 68 The contractor had been awarded a fiveyear multi-year contract to supply artillery targets; however, after two
years, the government gave notice to the contractor that funds would
not be available for the remaining three years of the contract and that
the items would not be ordered. The board found that sufficient funds
were in fact available and that the government had procured the product
from another contractor. Consequently, the government's actions were
held to constitute a termination for convenience. Contractors sometimes misapprehend the nature of the government's power to terminate
for convenience or the authority of government representatives to reach
settlements once a termination has been established. Western Appraisals
& Surveys26 9 reaffirmed the rule that the government may terminate for
convenience even in the absence of a clause to that effect in the contract.2 70 In connection with this rule, a distinction must be drawn be-

tween the contracting officer's authority or power to declare a termination and the jurisdiction of the boards to grant relief in termination for
convenience cases. Although it is not necessary that the contract contain such a clause in order to declare a termination, absent a clause under
which it can grant relief, a board generally will dismiss an appeal. As a
result, the contractor's remedy when there is no termination for convenience clause is a court suit. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. of Manila,
lnc 27 1

involved the issue of the authority of government representatives

to settle terminations for convenience. A contractor in good faith may
believe that a settlement has been reached; however, if the action of the
government representative participating in the settlement is subject to review by his superiors, the settlement is not binding on the government
until so approved. As a rule, any case involving a settlement of $50,000
or more is subject to review and approval by settlement review boards
within the agencies.272
9543, 14 G.C. 428.
269. AGBCA No. 271, 72-2 B.C.A. t 9596; cf. Circle, Inc., ENG BCA No. 3258,
268. ASBCA No. 12983, 72-2 B.CA.

72-1 B.C.A. 9451 (skeletal clause).
270. See note 251 supra & accompanying text.
271. ASBCA No. 13533, 72-1 B.C.A. 9415, on reconsideration,72-2 B.C.A.
272. See note 2 supra.
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A termination for convenience may result from a bid protest. For
example, if a contract is awarded as the result of a government mistake,
the generally accepted course of action is to terminate the contract for
the convenience of the government. '7 3 Since, under such circumstances,
the contractor would not have been at fault in the erroneous award, a
termination for convenience would be an equitable resolution. The
result would be different, however, if the contractor had contributed
to the error through fraud or other illegal methods.
One of the more significant cases decided during the past two years,
North Star Aviation Corp. v. United States,274 involved the question of
recoverability of anticipatory profits, as well as that of whether the contract had been terminated for convenience. As has been noted, 7 the
general rule is that anticipatory profits are not recoverable; this rule is
applicable even though the government's actions are held to have been
improper. In North Star Aviation, however, the contractor was able
to recover anticipatory profits because of the presence of special provisions in the contract. When the contractor furnished a performance
bond which did not satisfy the contractual requirements, the government declared a default termination. However, the contractor subsequently tendered a proper bond, still within the time allowed by the
contract. Although the government conceded and the Comptroller General agreed that the default termination was improper, no further action
was recommended since a successor contract already had been awarded.
The contracting officer denied the contractor's claim for damages, and
the board dismissed the appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Claims held that the wrongful termination was a common law breach of contract for which the measure of damages was the
loss of anticipatory profits. The court found that the default clause
used in the contract failed to include government error as a ground
upon which a wrongful default termination could be converted into a
convenience termination. Furthermore, the contract was found not to
273. See, e.g., Albano Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, Ct. CL. No. 188-67, 14 G.C.
T 88 (1972); COMP. GEN. B-176393 (October 13, 1972); Comp. GEN. B-173244 (1) &

(2), (August 10, 1972); Comp'. GEN. B-175243, 14 G.C. 336 (June 16, 1972); Comp.
B-173887, 14 G.C. 170 (March 16, 1972); Covp'. GEN. B-173703, 14 G.C. $ 167

GEN.

(February 7, 1972); Comp. GEN. B-174467, 14 G.C.

GEN. B-173545, 14 G.C. 83 (January 24, 1972).
274. Ct. Cl. No. 264-69, 14 G.C. 172 (1972).
275. See note 259 supra & accompanying text.

164 (February 4, 1972); CoMP.
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contain the usual termination for convenience clause. As has been
noted, 76 it has been held that the government has the power to declare
a termination for convenience even in the absence of a clause in the contract granting that right, where valid procurement regulations require inclusion of such a clause in the contract. However, in North Star Aviation, the applicable procurement regulations did not require the inclusion
of a termination for convenience clause. The only situation in which
a termination for convenience could have occurred under the contract
was where a wrongful default termination was converted into a termination for convenience. However, since the default clause limited such
conversions to default terminations which had occurred due to events
"beyond the control and without the fault or negligence" of the contractor, and since the improper default in this case had been a result of
government error, it was not possible to find that there had been a
termination for convenience. Therefore, the government's actions were
held to have been a common law breach of contract, and the usual prohibition in terminations for convenience against the recovery of anticipatory profits was not applicable.
B. The Termination Settlement
Profit, of course, is just one of the elements to be considered in the
settlement of a termination for convenience claim. Because contractors
do not anticipate terminations for convenience when bidding on government contracts, their accounting records often are not helpful in determining the allowability and amount of the various cost elements in
a termination claim. Although generalization among cost cases is difficult, a brief survey of the more significant decisions may be useful in
indicating fundamental principles.
Adequate proof of costs often is an insurmountable barrier to recovery. In Roberts InternationalCorp., 77 for example, the contracting
officer made a unilateral decision as to the amount of the settlement after
the contractor had failed for 33 months following termination to furnish
data or produce records supporting a claim for termination expenses.
Furthermore, during the 13 months after the docketing of his appeal,
the contractor failed to answer any of the board's correspondence extending to him the opportunity to submit data for consideration. As a
276. See note 251 supra & accompanying text.
277. ASBCA No. 15118, 71-1 B.C.A. 8869.
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result, the board was forced to decide the appeal based on the evidence
in the record and upheld the contracting officer's decision.
278
A similar result was reached in DelawareTool and Die Works, InG.,
where the contractor either could not or did not offer any proof that
he had incurred costs in performing work under parts of the contract
which the government had terminated for convenience. The only evidence presented was a general statement that costs had been incurred,
which statement clearly was not sufficient to satisfy the contractor's
burden of proof.
In extenuating circumstances, however, the contractor may be excused
from presenting actual cost records. For example, in Bailey Specialized
Buildings, Inc.,2 70 the contractor's cost records were destroyed through
no fault of his own. On remand from the Court of Claims, the board
computed allowable termination costs on the basis of the expert testimony
of accountants and a presentation of engineering and production evaluations. It was concluded that the evidence thus adduced provided a
reasonably reliable method of reconstructing the costs which had been
incurred.
Bailey also involved the issue of allowable termination settlement
expenses-those administrative and legal costs incurred by the contractor
as a direct result of the termination. The case had arisen after an improper default termination was converted to a termination for convenience; the long interval between these two events was found to be a
significant factor in determining the allowability of the settlement expenses. Recognizing the problem the contractor faced in reconstructing
his records, the board allowed a substantial recovery of legal and accounting fees, excluding, however, those costs related directly to the
appeal.2 "
Cost-plus contracts frequently present peculiar difficulties of settlement. When a CPFF or a similar contract is terminated before the work
has been completed, the fixed fee or profit factor has to be adjusted to
reflect the contractor's achievement. Emerson Electric Co.2 held that
a fee reduction is in the nature of a claim by the government and that
the government thus must establish both its right to a reduction in fee
and the amount thereof. In Technology Inc., 28 2 the contractor was per278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

8860.
ASBCA No. 14033, 71-1 B.C.A.
ASBCA No. 10576, 71-1 B.C.A. 8699.
See notes 262-64 supra & accompanying text.
ASBCA No. 15591, 72-1 B.C.A. 9440.
ASBCA No. 14083, 71-2 B.C.A. 8956, reconsiderationdenied, 72-1 B.C.A.
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forming under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract until it was terminated
for the convenience of the government. The contractor appealed from
the termination and the contracting officer's unilateral determination of
the recoverable settlement costs. The issues of dispute were the amount
of allowable overhead and the percentage of the fixed fee to
which the contractor was entitled. The percentage of completion
argued by the parties varied by as much as 30 percent. The contractor
argued that he had assumed a risk in the form of a ceiling on the costs
of materials and subcontracts and that this ceiling should be deemed the
measure of his percentage of completion. The board, however, rejected
this theory, noting that although a fixed price contractor assumes the
risk that the costs of materials and subcontracts will exceed the ceiling,
he is not entitled to profit until the work has been performed. Thus,
the contractor in Technology was held entitled to his fee only to the
extent that he had performed. The board noted that were it to adopt
the approach urged by the contractor, it would be difficult to find, under
the facts established, that the contractor had earned any significant
portion of the fee. The more precise approach based on the percentage
of completion of the work was found preferable. In applying this approach, however, the board noted that the percentage of completion
must be based on all indicators of completion, including direct labor expenditures incurred, vouchers submitted, and progress and milestone
charts prepared during performance. On the basis of the facts presented, it was found that the dollar expenditure for direct labor provided the most reliable estimate of the work completed, and the fee adjustment was computed on that basis.
The board in Technology rejected the contractor's claim for unabsorbed overhead, holding such overhead to be a continuing cost of an
ongoing organization and not a cost of the terminated contract. It was
conceded that the contractor's direct labor pool was reduced for some
months and therefore, as a result of the termination, was not at the level
anticipated during other months; the contractor was thus forced to
charge the overhead that would have been absorbed by the direct labor
under the terminated contract against direct labor under other contracts. However, the board held that if all of the unabsorbed overhead
were chargeable against the terminated contract, the government would
be placed in the position of a guarantor of the contractor's overhead,
a result which would be contrary to the intent and language of the
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termination clause. However, in Adam Barr's Son,2 88 where a 67-day
suspension of work preceded the termination, the contractor was held
entitled to an allowance for overhead but not for profits in his settlement. The refusal to allow a profit allowance for the period of the
suspension was based on a combined interpretation of the termination
clause, which permitted a reasonable allowance for profits on work
done under the contract, and the suspension of work clause, which disallowed profit allowances for periods of suspension. Thus, it can be seen
that a termination does not necessarily render a suspension of work
clause inapplicable.
C. Conclusion
The 75 termination for convenience cases decided during the past two
years are almost evenly split between those involving questions as to the
existence of a termination for convenience and those in which the
amount of the termination settlement was in issue. In the first category,
there has been a perceptible increase in the number of cases in which
the contractor has prevailed on a theory of constructive termination or
some variation thereof. A similar increase has occurred in the number
of cases in which a meritorious bid protest has resulted in the termination
for convenience of a contract which had been awarded to another contractor.
Pricing cases, however, continue to present difficult issues, in addition to requiring terminated contractors to find, digest, and apply an
overwhelming number of complicated procurement regulations and
pricing policies. Although proof of costs is in itself a difficult initial
hurdle, the contractor must also establish that particular cost elements
are allowable and that they are allocable to the terminated contract.
The cases underscore the necessity for a detailed and coordinated approach to termination settlements by contract administrators and their
accounting experts and legal counsel. Only through such combined
efforts can cost records be identified properly and costs audited, verified, and then defined in terms of allowability and allocation. Some issues, such as profit, will continue to be decided by the realities of negotiation; however, a firm understanding of the principles involved is
highly beneficial in achieving amicable resolution of termination settlements.
283. ASBCA No. 15178, 71-1 B.C.A.
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APPENDIX A
TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT-DAMAGES FOR DELAY-TIME
EXTENSIONS (1969 AUG)
(a) If the Contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the work, or any
separable part thereof, with such diligence as will insure its completion within the time specified in this contract, or any extension thereof, or fails to
complete said work within such time, the Government may, by written
notice to the Contractor, terminate his right to proceed with the work or
such part of the work as to which there has been delay. In such event the
Government may take over the work and prosecute the same to completion, by contract or otherwise, and may take possession of and utilize in
completing the work such materials, appliances, and plant as may be on the
site of the work and necessary therefor. Whether or not the Contractor's
right to proceed with the work is terminated, he and his sureties shall be
liable for any damage to the Government resulting from his refusal or
failure to complete the work within the specified time.
(b) If fixed and agreed liquidated damages are provided in the contract
and if the Government so terminates the Contractor's right to proceed, the
resulting damage will consist of such liquidated damages until such reasonable time as may be required for final completion of the work together
with any increased costs occasioned the Government in completing the
work.
(c)If fixed and agreed liquidated damages are provided in the contract
and if the Government does not so terminate the Contractor's right to proceed, the resulting damage will consist of such liquidated damages until the
work is completed or accepted.
(d)The Contractor's right to proceed shall not be so terminated nor the
Contractor charged with resulting damage if:
(1) The delay in the completion of the work arises from unforeseeable
causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor, including but not restricted to, acts of God, acts of the public
enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with
the Government, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes,
freight embargoes, unusually severe weather, or delays of subcontractors
or suppliers arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of both the Contractor and such subcontractors
or suppliers; and
(2) The Contractor, within 10 days from the beginning of any such
delay (unless the Contracting Officer grants a further period of time before
the date of final payment under the contract), notifies the Contracting
Officer in writing of the causes of delay. The Contracting Officer shall ascertain the facts and the extent of the delay and extend the time for completing the work when, in his judgment, the findings of fact justify such an
extension, and his findings of fact shall be final and conclusive on the
parties, subject only to appeal as provided in the "Disputes" clause of this
contract.

(e)If, after notice of termination of the Contractor's right to proceed
under the provisions of this clause, it is determined for any reason that
the Contractor was not in default under the provisions of this clause, or
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that the delay was excusable under the provisions of this clause, the rights
and obligations of the parties shall, if the contract contains a clause providing for termination for convenience of the Government, be the same as if the
notice of termination had been issued pursuant to such clause. If, in the
foregoing circumstances, this contract does not contain a clause providing
for termination for convenience of the Government, the contract shall be
equitably adjusted to compensate for such termination and the contract
modified accordingly; failure to agree to any such adjustment shall be a
dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of
this contract entitled "Disputes".
(f) The rights and remedies of the Government provided in this clause
are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided by law or under
this contract.
(g) As used in paragraph (d) (1) of this clause, the term "subcontractors
or suppliers" means subcontractors or suppliers at any tier. '
See Federal Procurement Regulation (hereinafter FPR) 1-9.709-1 and 1-8.709-2 for
equivalent clauses for civilian agencies awarding fixed price construction contracts.
There are additional clauses for use in different kinds of, contracts, for example,
ASPR 7-103.11 and FPR 1-8.707 for fixed price supply contracts, the former of which
is as follows:
DEFAULT (1969 AUG)
(a) The Government may, subject to the provisions of paragraph (c)
below, by written notice of default to the Contractor, terminate the whole
or any part of this contract in any one of the following circumstances:
(i) if the Contractor fails to make delivery of the supplies or to
perform the services within the time specified herein or any
extension thereof; or
(ii) if the Contractor fails to perform any of the other provisions
of this contract, or so fails to make progress as to endanger
performance of this contract in accordance with its terms, and
in either of these two circumstances does not cure such failure
within a period of 10 days (or such longer period as the Contracting Officer may authorize in writing) after receipt of notice
from the Contracting Officer specifying such failure.
(b) In the event the Government terminates this contract in whole or
in part as provided in paragraph (a) of this clause, the Government may
procure, upon such terms and in such manner as the Contracting Officer
may deem appropriate, supplies or services similar to those so terminated,
and the Contractor shall be liable to the Government for any excess costs
for such similar supplies or services; provided, that the contractor shall
continue the performance of this contract to the extent not terminated
under the provisions of this clause.
(c) Except with respect to defaults of subcontractors, the Contractor shall
not be liable for any excess costs if the failure to perform the contract arises
out of causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the
Contractor. Such causes may include, but are not restricted to, acts of God
or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or
contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes,
freight embargoes, and unusually severe weather; but in every case the
failure to perform must be beyond the control and without the fault or
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negligence of the Contractor. If the failure to perform is caused by the default of a subcontractor, and if such default arises out of causes beyond
the control of both the Contractor and subcontractor, and without the
fault or negligence of either of them, the Contractor shall not be liable
for any excess costs for failure to perform, unless the supplies or services
to be furnished by the subcontractor were obtainable from other sources in
sufficient time to permit the Contractor to meet the required delivery
schedule.
(d) If this contract is terminated as provided in paragraph (a) of this
clause, the Government, in addition to any other rights provided in this
clause, may require the Contractor to transfer title and deliver to the
Government, in the manner and to the extent directed by the Contracting
Officer, (i) any completed supplies, and (ii) such partially completed
supplies and materials, parts, tools, dies, jigs, fixtures, plans, drawings, information, and contract rights (hereinafter called "manufacturing materials") as the Contractor has specifically produced or specifically acquired
for the performance of such part of this contract as has been terminated;
and the Contractor shall, upon direction of the Contracting Officer, protect
and preserve property in the possession of the Contractor in which the
Govenment has an interest. Payment for completed supplies delivered to
and accepted by the Government shall be at the contract price. Payment
for manufacturing materials delivered to and accepted by the Government
and for the protection and preservation of property shall be in an amount
agreed upon by the Contractor and Contracting Officer; failure to agree to
such amount shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the
meaning of the clause of this contract entitled "Disputes". The Government
may withhold from amounts otherwise due the Contractor for such completed supplies or manufacturing materials such sum as the Contracting
Officer determines to be necessary to protect the Government against loss
because of outstanding liens or claims of former lien holders.
(e) If, after notice of termination of this contract under the provisions
of this clause, it is determined for any reason that the Contractor was not
in default under the provisions of this clause, or that the default was excusable under the provisions of this clause, the rights and obligations of
the parties shall, if the contract contains a clause providing for termination
for convenience of the Government, be the same as if the notice of termination had been issued pursuant to such clause. If, after notice of termination
of this contract under the provisions of this clause, it is determined for
any reason that the Contractor was not in default under the provisions of
this clause, and if this contract does not contain a clause providing for
termination for convenience of the Government, the contract shall be
equitably adjusted to compensate for such termination and the contract
modified accordingly; failure to agree to any such adjustment shall be a
dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause
of this contract entitled 'Disputes".
(f) The rights and remedies of the Government provided in this clause
shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies
provided by law or under this contract.
(g) As used in paragraph (c) of this clause, the terms "subcontractor"
and "subcontractors" mean subcontractor(s) at any tier.
ASPR 7-203.10 or FPR 1-8.702 are used in cost reimbursement type contracts.
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APPENDIX B
TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT
(1971 NOV)
(a) The performance of work under this contract may be terminated
by the Government in accordance with this clause in whole, or from
time to time in part, whenever the Contracting Officer shall determine
that such termination is in the best interest of the Government. Any such
termination shall be effected by delivery to the Contractor of a Notice of
Termination specifying the extent to which performance of work under
the contract is terminated, and the date upon which such termination becomes effective.
(b) After receipt of a Notice of Termination, and except as otherwise
directed by the Contracting Officer, the Contractor shall,
(i) stop work under the contract on the date and to the extent
specified in the Notice of Termination;
(ii) place no further orders or subcontracts for materials, services
of facilities, except as may be necessary for completion of such
portion of the work under the contract as is not terminated;
(il) terminate all orders and subcontracts to the extent that they
relate to the performance of work terminated by the Notice
of Termination;
(iv) assign to the Government, in the manner, at the times, and to
the extent directed by the Contracting Officer, all of the
right, title, and interest of the Contractor under the orders
and subcontracts so terminated, in which case the Government
shall have the right, in its discretion, to settle or pay any or
all claims arising out of the termination of such orders and subcontracts;
(v) settle all outstanding liabilities and all claims arising out of
such termination of orders and subcontracts, with the approval
or ratification of the Contracting Officer, to the extent he may
require, which approval or ratification shall be final for all
the purposes of this clause;
(vi) transfer title and deliver to the Government, in the manner, at
the times, and to the extent, if any, directed by the Contracting
Officer, (A) the fabricated or unfabricated parts, work in
process, completed work, supplies, and other material produced as a part of, or acquired in connection with the performance of the work terminated by the Notice of Termination, and (B) the completed or partially completed plans, drawings, information, and other property which, if the contract had
been completed, would have been required to be furnished
to the Government;
(vii) use his best efforts to sell, in the manner, at the times, to the
extent, and at the price or prices directed or authorized by the
Contracting Officer, any property of the types referred to in
(vi) above; provided, however, that the Contractor (A) shall
not be required to extend credit to any purchaser, and (B)
may acquire any such property under the conditions prescribed
by and at a price or prices approved by the Contracting Officer; and prozdded further that the proceeds of any such

1973]

GOVERNMENT TERMINATIONS

transfer or disposition shall be applied in reduction of any
payments to be made by the Government to the Contractor
under this contract or shall otherwise be credited to the price
or cost of the work covered by this contract or paid in such
other manner as the Contracting Officer may direct;
(viii) complete performance of such part of the work as shall not
have been terminated by the Notice of Termination; and
(ix) take such action as may be necessary, or as the Contracting
Officer may direct, for the protection and preservation of the
property related to this contract which is in the possession of
the Contractor and in which the Government has or may acquire an interest.
At any time after expiration of the plant clearance period, as defined in
Section VIII, Armed Services Procurement Regulation, as it may be
amended from time to time, the Contractor may submit to the Contracting
Officer a list, certified as to quantity and quality, of any or all items of
termination inventory not previously disposed of, exclusive of items the
disposition of which has been directed or authorized by the Contracting
Officer, and may request the Government to remove such items or enter
into a storage agreement covering them. Not later than fifteen (15) days
thereafter, the Government will accept title to such items and remove
them or enter into a storage agreement covering the same; proided, that
the list submitted shall be subject to verification by the Contracting Officer
upon removal of the items, or if the items are stored, within forty-five
(45) days from the date of submission of the list, and any necessary adjustment to correct the list as submitted shall be made prior to final settlement.
(c) After receipt of a Notice of Termination, the Contractor shall submit to the Contracting Officer his termination claim, in the form and with
certification prescribed by the Contracting Officer. Such claim shall be submitted promptly but in no event later than one year from the effective date
of termination, unless one or more extensions in writing are granted by the
Contracting Officer, upon request of the Contractor made in writing within
such one year period or authorized extension thereof. However, if the
Contracting Officer determines that the facts justify such action, he may
receive and act upon any such termination claim at any time after such
one year period or any extension thereof. Upon failure of the Contractor
to submit his termination claim within the time allowed, the Contracting
Officer may, subject to any Settlement Review Board approvals required
by Section VIII of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation in effect
as of the date of execution of this contract, determine, on the basis of information available to him, the amount, if any, due to the Contractor by
reason of the termination and shall thereupon pay to the Contractor the
amount so determined.
(d) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (c), and subject to any Settlement Review Board approvals required by Section VIII of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation in effect as of the date of execution of this
contract, the Contractor and the Contracting Officer may agree upon the
whole or any part of the amount or amounts to be paid to the Contractor
by reason of the total or partial termination of work pursuant to this clause,
which amount or amounts may include a reasonable allowance for profit on
work done; provided, that such agreed amount or amounts, exclusive of
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settlement costs, shall not exceed the total contract price as reduced by the
amount of payments otherwise made and as further reduced by the contract
price of work not terminated. The contract shall be amended accordingly,
and the Contractor shall be paid the agreed amount. Nothing in paragraph
(e) of this clause, prescribing the amount to be paid to the Contractor in
the event of failure of the Contractor and the Contracting Officer to agree
upon the whole amount to be paid to the Contractor by reason of the termination of work pursuant to this clause, shall be deemed to limit, restrict,
or otherwise determine or affect the amount or amounts which may be
agreed upon to be paid to the Contractor pursuant to this paragraph (d).
(e) In the event of the failure of the Contractor and the Contracting
Officer to agree, as provided in paragraph (d), upon the whole amount to
be paid to the Contractor by reason of the termination of work pursuant
to this clause, the Contracting Officer shall, subject to any Settlement Review Board approvals required by Section VIII of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation in effect as of the date of execution of this contract,
pay to the Contractor the amounts determined by the Contracting Officer
as follows, but without duplication of any amounts agreed upon in accordance with paragraph (d):
(i)
With respect to all contract work performed prior to the effective date of the Notice of Termination, the total (without
duplication of any items) of(A) the cost of such work;
(B) the cost of settling and paying claims arising out of the
termination of work under subcontracts or orders as provided in paragraph (b) Cv) above, exclusive of the
amounts paid or payable on account of supplies or materials delivered or services furnished by the subcontractor prior to the effective date of the Notice of Termination of Work under this contract, which amounts shall
be included in the cost on account of which payment is
made under (A) above; and
(C) a sum, as profit on (A) above, determined by the
Contracting Officer pursuant to 8-303 of the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation, in effect as of the date
of execution of this contract, to be fair and reasonable;
provided, however, that if it appears that the Contractor would have sustained a loss on the entire contract had
it been completed, no profit shall be included or allowed
under this subdivision (C) and an appropriate adjustment
shall be made reducing the amount of the settlement to
reflect the indicated rate of loss; and
(ii) the reasonable cost of the preservation and protection of property incurred pursuant to paragraph (b) (ix); and any other
reasonable cost incidental to termination of work under this
contract, including expense incidental to the determination
of the amount due to the Contractor as the result of the
termination of work under this contract.
The total sum to be paid to the Contractor under (i) above shall not exceed
the total contract price as reduced by the amount of payments otherwise
made and as further reduced by the contract price of work not terminated.

1973]

GOVERNMENT TERMINATIONS

Except for normal spoilage, and except to the extent that the Government
shall have otherwise expressly assumed the risk of loss, there shall be excluded from the amounts payable to the Contractor under (i) above, the fair
value, as determined by the Contracting Officer, of property which is destroyed, lost, stolen, or damaged so as to become undeliverable to the Government, or to a buyer pursuant to paragraph (b) (vii).
(f) Costs claimed, agreed to, or determined pursuant to (c), (c), and
(e) hereof shall be in accordance with Section XV of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation as in effect of the date of this contract.
(g) The Contractor shall have the right of appeal, under the clause of
this contract entitled "Disputes," from any determination made by the Contracting Officer under paragraph (c) or (e) above, except that if the Contractor has failed to submit his claim within the time provided in paragraph
(c) above and has failed to request extension of such time, he shall have
no such right of appeal. In any case where the Contracting Officer has
made a determination of the amount due under paragraph (c) or (e) above,
the Government shall pay to the Contractor the following: (i) if there is
no right of appeal hereunder or if no timely appeal has been taken, the
amount so determined by the Contracting Officer, or (ii) if an appeal has
been taken, the amount finally determined on such appeal.
(h) In arriving at the amount due the Contractor under this clause there
shall be deducted (i) all unliquidated advance or other payments on account theretofore made to the Contractor, applicable to the terminated portion of this contract, (ii) any claim which the Government may have
against the Contractor in connection with this contract, and (iii) the agreed
price for, or the proceeds of sale of, any materials, supplies, or other things
acquired by the Contractor or sold, pursuant to the provisions of this clause,
and not otherwise recovered by or credited to the Government.
i) If the termination hereunder be partial, prior to the settlement of the
terminated portion of this contract, the Contractor may file with the Contracting Officer a request in writing for an equitable adjustment of the
price or prices specified in the contract relating to the continued portion
of the contract (the portion not terminated by the Notice of Termination),
and such equitable adjustment as may be agreed upon shall be made in such
price or prices.
(j) The Government may from time to time, under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, make partial payments and payments on account
against costs incurred by the Contractor in connection with the terminated
portion of this contract whenever in the opinion of the Contracting Officer
the aggregate of such payments shall be within the amount to which the
Contractor will be entitled hereunder. If the total of such payments is in
excess of the amount finally agreed or determined to be due under this
clause, such excess shall be payable by the Contractor to the Government
upon demand, together with interest computed at the rate of 6 percent per
annum, for the period from the date such excess payment is received by
the Contractor to the date on which such excess is repaid to the Government; provided, however, that no interest shall be charged with respect to
any such excess payment attributable to a reduction in the Contractor's
claim by reason of retention or other disposition of termination inventory
until ten days after the date of such retention or disposition, or such later
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date as determined by the Contracting Officer by reason of the circumstances.
(k) Unless otherwise provided for in this contract, or by applicable
statute, the Contractor, from the effective date of termination and for a
period of three years after final settlement under this contract shall preserve
and make available to the Government at all reasonable times at the office
of the Contractor but without direct charge to the Government, all his
books, records, documents and other evidence bearing on the costs and
expenses of the Contractor under this contract and relating to the work
terminated hereunder, or, to the extent approved by the Contracting Officer,
photographs, microphotographs, or other authentic reproductions thereof.
See FPR 1-8.703 for use in civilian contracts.

